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NEGOTIATING THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT:
THE 1913 FEDERAL RESERVE ACT AS A
DEBATE OVER CREDIT DISTRIBUTION
NADAV ORIAN PEER*
“Lending of last resort” is one of the key powers of central banks. As a
lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) famously supports com-
mercial banks facing distressed liquidity conditions, thereby mitigating de-
stabilizing bank runs. Less famously, lender-of-last-resort powers also influ-
ence the distribution of credit among different groups in society and therefore
have high stakes for economic inequality. The Fed’s role as a lender of last
resort witnessed an unprecedented expansion during the 2007–2009 Crisis
when the Fed invoked emergency powers to lend to a new set of borrowers
known as “shadow banks”. The decision proved controversial and spurred
legislative reform narrowing the Fed’s authority as well as an ongoing schol-
arly debate. Participants in this debate, the Article argues, limited their focus
to financial stability considerations, thereby neglecting those powers’ consid-
erable distributive implications.
This Article contributes to the current literature by demonstrating the
distributive stakes of lender-of-last-resort powers through a concrete historical
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example: the legislative debate around the 1913 Federal Reserve Act that
established the Fed. During that time, three different groups debated the legal
definition of “eligible collateral” that the Fed could accept from borrowers to
secure emergency loans. The first group was corporate financiers, who were
interested in supporting capital markets. The second group was the Demo-
cratic framers of the Act, who tried to divert credit away from corporate
securities and into small businesses. The third group was farmers that
needed credit for developing the agrarian periphery. I argue that each of
these groups tried to shape the definition of eligible collateral in ways that
would promote that group’s unique credit needs and reduce its borrowing
costs. For us today, this history is an invitation to reconsider the distributive
implications of the current lender-of-last-resort powers and revise them ac-
cordingly.
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INTRODUCTION
The power to act as a “lender of last resort” is one of the
key roles of central banks: in the United States, the Federal
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Reserve System (the “Fed”).1 As a lender of last resort, the Fed
comes to the rescue of banks facing distressed liquidity condi-
tions. These liquidity stresses arise occasionally due to “matur-
ity mismatch,” which is an essential feature of banking. While
banks’ hold their assets in the form of long-term loans, their
sources of funding consist primarily of demand liabilities, like
deposits.2 When a large number of depositors demand pay-
ment simultaneously, a bank cannot liquidate its long-term as-
sets with sufficient speed and so must fail.3 This is where the
Fed’s lender-of-last-resort powers become relevant. The Fed
lends to distressed banks by taking their long-term assets as
collateral, and providing them with immediately available
funds to make necessary payments to depositors.4
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 witnessed a dramatic ex-
pansion in the Fed’s role as a lender of last resort.5 Histori-
cally, this role was limited to supporting the traditional com-
mercial banking system. In the crisis, the Fed decided to ex-
tend its support to the “shadow banking” system that
developed over the past decades.6 Shadow banking, in brief,
refers to institutions—like broker–dealers, hedge funds and
others—that borrow on short maturities (often overnight) and
invest in long-term securities.7 Thus, shadow banking is a varia-
1. Ben Bernanke, Fed Emergency Lending, BROOKINGS (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2015/12/03/fed-emergen
cy-lending/.
2. Id. (“The most important tool that central banks (like the Fed) have
for fighting financial panics is their ability to serve as a lender of last resort.”).
3. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Common Capital: A Thought Experiment in Cross-
Border Resolution, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 355, 360 (2014).
4. Bernanke, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Michael J. Fleming, Federal Reserve Liquidity Provision During
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 161, 167, 175 (2012)
6. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, What Legal Authority Does the Fed Need During a
Financial Crisis?, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1529, 1546 (2017).
7. See PERRY MEHRLING ET AL., BAGEHOT WAS A SHADOW BANKER: SHADOW
BANKING, CENTRAL BANKING, AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 2, CTR.
EUR. U. (2013), https://www.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/attachment/ev
ent/6574/nov05-perry-mehrling.pdf (defining shadow banking as “money
market funding of capital market lending”). For a different but related defi-
nition of shadow banking, see MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RE-
THINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 96 (2016). For a discussion of shadow bank-
ing, see also Nadav Orian Peer, Your Grandfather’s Shadow Banking: Clearing
and Governance in Gilded Age New York, in INSIDE MONEY: RE-THEORIZING LI-
QUIDITY (Christine Desan ed., forthcoming 2019).
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tion on the essential feature of banking (maturity mismatch)
and is vulnerable to similar liquidity strains.8 The shadow
banking system was at the heart of the market for subprime
mortgage securitization that had grown rapidly since the early
2000s.9 As pressures grew in that market, the Fed invoked
emergency powers in the Federal Reserve Act (the “Act”) that
authorized it to lend to counterparties other than commercial
banks.10
The Fed’s lender-of-last-resort support to the shadow
banking system proved highly controversial. Some welcomed
the Fed’s actions as a necessary adaption of the century-old
authority to modern financial conditions.11 Others were con-
cerned with lack of accountability, moral hazard, and potential
ramifications for future financial instability.12 Ultimately, the
2010 Dodd–Frank Act reflected a middle ground between
these positions. It posed considerable constraints on the Fed’s
emergency powers while not eliminating them altogether.13
8. RICKS, supra note 7, at x.
9. Zoltan Poszar et al., Shadow Banking, 19 ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2013).
10. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 13(3), 38 Stat. 251,
263 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). For use of this
authority in a crisis, see Posner, supra note 6, at 1546–47. The more common
(“peacetime”) authority the Fed uses allows lending on to its own member
banks. Federal Reserve Act of 1913 § 10B. This authority was left unchanged
by the Dodd–Frank Act. See infra note 13.
11. See, e.g., PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2010); MEHRLING ET AL., supra note 7;
Posner, supra note 6.
12. This position was taken in what journalists described as an “unlikely
pairing” between Senators Elizabeth Warren (D, Massachusetts) and David
Vitter (R, Louisiana). Natalie Johnson, Warren, Vitter Team up to Take on Wall
Street’s ‘Too Big to Fail’ Megabanks, DAILY SIGNAL (Sept. 17, 2015), http://daily
signal.com/2015/09/17/warren-vitter-team-up-to-take-on-wall-streets-too-
big-to-fail-megabanks. See also JAMES CROTTY & GERALD EPSTEIN, DEP’T OF
ECON. AND POL. ECON. RESEARCH INST., THE COSTS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF
THE LENDER-OF-LAST RESORT FUNCTION IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE
SUB-PRIME CRISIS OF 2007–2008 (2008).
13. As amended by the Dodd–Frank Act, section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012), now requires a number of conditions
and procedures including prior approval by the Secretary of the Treasury,
“broad based eligibility” criteria for borrowers, assignment of “lendable
value” to collateral and extensive reporting to Congress. See Press Release,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board Approves
Final Rule Specifying Its Procedures for Emergency Lending Under Section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.federalre
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Today, the question of whether lender-of-last-resort sup-
port should be extended to shadow banks remains a central
concern among policy makers and financial lawyers.14 My own
concern in this Article is with the terms on which this question
is being debated. This Article, in other words, does not take a
position either in favor or against extension of the authority,
but instead choses to focus on certain blind spots that both
proponents and opponents in this debate actually share in
common.
This Article argues that the post-crisis discussion on
lender-of-last-resort authority is premised on a powerful—but
highly incomplete—narrative of the creation of that authority
by the Act.15 According to that narrative, the defining precipi-
tant of the Act is the long period of financial instability that
plagued the U.S. financial system in the absence of a central
bank, following President Jackson’s 1832 veto of the recharter-
ing of the Second Bank of the United States.16 Commentators
understand the Act as a belated response to a string of bank-
ing panics that erupted during that period, including the pan-
ics of 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and the infamous Panic of
1907.17 As a point of divergence, in Europe—where central
banks were well institutionalized by that time—banking panics
were alleviated by authorizing central banks to act as lenders
of last resort. On the other hand, it took the Panic of 1907
serve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20151130a.htm (describing how
the new rule implements these requirements). For critiques of the new rules,
see, for example, Posner, supra note 6, at 1532, 1574; Morgan Ricks, Regulat-
ing Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 75, 130–31 (2011).
14. See MEHRLING ET AL., supra note 7; Posner, supra note 6; Ricks, supra
note 13. For related Post-Crisis legal scholarship on lenders of last resort,
see, for example, Dan Awrey, Brother, Can You Spare a Dollar? Designing an
Effective Framework for Foreign Currency Liquidity Assistance, 3 COLUM BUS. L.
REV. 934 (2017); Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of
Last Resort, 116 COLUM L. REV. 843 (2016); Hal S. Scott, Interconnectedness
and Contagion—Financial Panics and the Crisis of 2008 (June 26, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2178475&download=yes.
15. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251
(1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522 (2006)).
16. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139–54 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
17. For a discussion of these panics, see O.M.W. SPRAGUE, HISTORY OF
CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM (Forgotten Books ed. 2009)
(1910).
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with its violent economic contraction before Congress created
a parallel institution in the United States.
Thus, the conventional narrative nearly exclusively fo-
cuses on financial stability considerations.18 While financial
stability concerns were certainly important in the creation of
the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort authority, the conventional nar-
rative leaves out other, crucial considerations. Most impor-
tantly, it ignores that the Act was also designed to shape the
distribution of credit in society. More than simply reacting to
years of financial panics, the Act was equally the culmination
of a contentious political debate in the United States concern-
ing the distribution of credit among different groups and com-
peting interests in the economy.19
Examining the Congressional Record, accounts by key re-
formers, and detailed analysis of the turn-of-the-century finan-
cial system, this Article reconstructs the history of the Act as
the outcome of the debate over credit distribution. This Arti-
cle focuses on the competing agendas of three groups that
participated in this debate, each with its own distinct vision for
economic life in the United States: the Corporate Agenda, the
Urban-Competitive Agenda, and the Regional Development
Agenda.20
The Corporate Agenda was primarily advanced by New
York corporate financiers and the large industrial corporations
18. In their use of the conventional narrative, financial lawyers are build-
ing on an important branch of financial history. See infra Section I.A for
discussion and critique. Examples of lawyers’ adoption of this history in-
clude: Scott, supra note 14, at 3, 19, 72, 93; Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of
Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 322 (2013); RICKS, supra note 7, at 161.
19. The duality of financial stability and credit distribution concerns is
reflected nicely in the Committee Report of the Senate Committee of Bank-
ing and Currency: “The chief purposes of the banking and currency bill is
to . . . prevent panics or financial stringencies; make available effective com-
mercial credit for individuals engaged in manufacturing, in commerce, in
finance, and in business to the extent of their just deserts . . . .” S. REP. NO.
63-133, at 6003 (1913). My theoretical focus on credit distribution builds on
Christine Desan’s work, The Constitutional Approach to Money. See infra note 69
and Section I.C.
20. I chose the word “agenda” to encompass both the political ideals as
well as the material interests of members of each group. Interests and ideals
intersect in complex ways that I do not attempt to disentangle. Also, the
three agendas are intentionally heuristic: a useful schema rather than an
attempt to capture the distributive debate in its entire complexity.
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they served.21 Already well-established by the turn-of-the-cen-
tury, they promoted an economy organized around large cor-
porations with market power in their respective industries. Ac-
cording to these corporate financiers, market power was neces-
sary to cure the ills of “ruinous competition” that plagued
rapid industrialization following the late nineteenth-century.22
The Urban-Competitive Agenda was a reaction to the rise
of corporate power. This agenda was primarily advanced by
the mainstream of the Democratic Party, winners of the 1912
presidential election by a landslide.23 Influenced by the ideas
of Louis Brandeis, mainstream Democrats called for a return
to competition through a package of reforms of which the Act
was a key component. However, the scope of their agenda was
limited to already established industries in urban centers.
The Regional Development Agenda was primarily ad-
vanced by country bankers, farmers, and small producers on
the periphery left out of the Urban-Competitive Agenda.24
They called for developing the agrarian economy that, at the
time, employed around one third of the U.S. workforce.25
The development of lender-of-last-resort power was pro-
foundly impacted by the ways in which the credit needs of
each of these three groups were—or weren’t—met by the fi-
nancial system that existed prior to the Act and the ways each
group approached the Act to rewire the financial system for its
benefit. This Article reconstructs this history by tracking three
different types of credit instruments corresponding to the ac-
tivities each of the groups found most desirable: “call loans”
that supported corporate securities, “commercial paper” that
funded Main Street urban borrowing, and “accommodation
paper” that funded the agrarian economy.
Call loans were made by banks to brokers on the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”). These loans were extremely
21. For the Corporate Agenda and the assertions of this paragraph, see
infra Part IV.
22. For the notion of “ruinous competition,” see infra Section I.B.
23. For the Urban-Competitive Agenda and the assertions of this para-
graph, see infra Part II.
24. For the Regional Development Agenda and the assertions of this par-
agraph, see infra Part III.
25. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1789–1945: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 63 (1949).
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short-term (i.e., overnight), but the NYSE brokers used them
to fund long-term corporate securities. From the banks’ point
of view, call loans were a highly liquid asset that allowed them
to meet their obligation to redeem deposits on demand. The
nexus between the banking system and the call loan market
supported the enormous expansion in corporate capital in the
decades preceding the Act.26
Corporate financiers had been campaigning for the crea-
tion of a central bank since around 1900,27 but that campaign
took a decisive turn after Woodrow Wilson’s election in 1912.
The Wilson Administration reframed the creation of a central
bank as an opportunity to disrupt the nexus between the bank-
ing system and the stock exchange and to divert the flow of
credit away from corporate securities and into Main Street bor-
rowing.28
The cornerstone of the Democrats’ agenda was to replace
call loans with Main Street friendly commercial paper as the
asset banks use to manage their liquidity. As enshrined in the
original language of the Act, commercial paper was defined as
short-term borrowing “arising out of actual commercial trans-
actions” to support “agricultural, industrial or commercial pur-
poses.”29 Section 13 authorized the Fed, to act as a lender of
last resort against commercial paper but specifically excluded
call loans from this definition.30 Thus, at its origins, lender-of-
last-resort authority was integral to the plan of shifting credit
from call loans to commercial paper.
26. For a discussion of call loans, see infra Parts II & IV.
27. See JAMES LIVINGSTON, Forgoing a Consensus on Central Banking, 1906–8,
in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: MONEY, CLASS, AND CORPORATE
CAPITALISM, 1890–1913 (1989). “These men [referring to prominent bank-
ers] had since 1901 been leading the discussion in New York of centralized
banking.” Id. at 159.
28. Some legal scholars, including Peter Conti-Brown and Sabeel
Rahman, have recognized the emergence of the Democrat critique of corpo-
rate concentration as a transformative moment in the lead-up to the Federal
Reserve Act. The focus of their work, however, is with the Fed’s organization
and governance rather than its effects on credit distribution which is our
central concern here. See generally PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER OF INDE-
PENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 17–23 (2017); SABEEL RAHMAN, GOV-
ERNING THE ECONOMY: MARKETS, EXPERTS, AND CITIZENS 112–16 (2013).
29. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 13(3), 38 Stat.
251, 263 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)).
30. For a more complete discussion of this provision, see infra Section
II.C.
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Mainstream Democrats’ harnessing of commercial paper
against corporate finance mobilized support behind the Act,
but it also created tensions with agrarian interests. Commer-
cial paper was, by design, a rather short-term credit instru-
ment.31 Its short duration would have excluded vast portions
of the peripheral economy that revolved around more flexible
and informal credit known as “accommodation paper.”
The drama that ensued between the three agendas under-
scores the importance of conceptual frameworks, political ne-
gotiations and delicate coalitions in the making of lender-of-
last-resort power. As Figure 1 illustrates, these three agendas
simultaneously had deep tensions and shared commitments.
The Corporate and Urban-Competitive Agendas were at odds
on the issue of corporate concentration, but agreed on impor-
tant aspects of orthodox central banking theory. In turn, the
Urban-Competitive and Regional Development Agendas were
united in their aversion to corporate concentration, but the
former’s emphasis on short-term credit was incongruent with
the latter’s need for longer-term borrowing. Finally, the Cor-
porate and Regional Development Agendas both demanded
access to long-term capital, but they were deeply divided in all
other respects.
FIGURE 1: THE THREE AGENDAS: TENSIONS AND SHARED COMMITMENTS
31. See infra Section II.C. The short duration of the paper was related to
the “real bills” doctrine to be discussed throughout the Article. An exception
in the section granted the Federal Reserve Board authority to extend the
maturity for six months borrowing for agricultural purposes. See infra Section
III.C. Curiously, the language of the original section 13 has largely survived
in the modern Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343, but it is now a relic,
eclipsed by the far broader authorities later added in sections 10B and 13(3).
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This Article’s title—Negotiating the Lender of Last Resort—
alludes to the complex political compromise that produced
the Fed’s original lender-of-last-resort authority. On the one
hand, mainstream Democrats secured agrarians’ support by
partially accommodating their demands for longer maturities.
On the other hand, despite the avowed anti-corporate purpose
of the bill, Democrats were surprisingly successful in winning
the support of corporate financiers. This article will shed light
on this apparent paradox, explaining why corporate financiers
still stood to benefit from the reform.
Some historians interpreted corporate financiers’ support
of the Act as a confirmation of the thesis that financial reform
ultimately works to the benefit of corporate interests.32 That
conclusion reads a causal relationship into the Act that is un-
warranted once the contemporaneous debate over credit dis-
tribution is brought to the fore. Such deterministic reading
fails to appreciate the moment of enactment as the result of a
public debate with high stakes and a range of possibilities for
the design of the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort authority.
This range of possibilities, each having different distribu-
tive implications, demonstrates that the Fed’s powers were
never designed to be a neutral tool. These powers are embed-
ded with distributive agendas, grand public policies that they
implement, although we rarely speak of them in those terms.
Since their enactment over a century ago, lender-of-last-resort
powers have undergone numerous revisions. Yet, these powers
today continue to be grand public policy conveyed at a
whisper, no more “neutral” than they were a century ago.
One of the most exciting developments in legal scholar-
ship since the 2008 crisis has been the growing recognition of
the monetary system as a product of legal design, and hence,
subject to legal revision.33 Building on these efforts, the history
offered in this Article is a step towards a renewed appreciation
32. See infra Section I.B for a discussion of Corporate Liberal historiogra-
phy.
33. See, e.g., TAMARA LOTHIAN, LAW AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: FI-
NANCE, PROSPERITY, AND DEMOCRACY (2017); RICKS, supra note 7; CHRISTINE
DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM
(2014); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017); Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe
Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (2016); Roy Kreitner, Legal History of Money, 8
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 415 (2012); Roy Kreitner, Money in the 1890s: The
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of the distributive stakes of lender-of-last-resort powers. Cur-
rent debates over reforms to lender-of-last-resort powers,
therefore, are about more than securing greater financial sta-
bility. They are a chance to uncover the distributive schemes
embedded in the current provisions of the Act and hold a pub-
lic debate on their revision.
The remainder of the Article is divided into four parts.
Part I discusses major themes in the historical literature on the
origins of the Fed. These themes will help explain the emer-
gence of the conventional narrative, as well as the critiques in-
forming this Article. Parts II to IV discuss the Corporate, Ur-
ban-Competitive, and Regional Development Agendas and
each respective group’s disposition towards the Act. The Con-
clusion briefly explains how the Article might help frame de-
bates and programmatic proposals over lenders of last resort
today.
I.
RECEIVED ACCOUNTS OF THE ORIGINS OF THE FED
The conventional narrative of the Act is informed by a
dominant account in financial history. That account views
lender-of-last-resort powers in terms that are functional and ra-
tionalistic. I will refer to this tradition as “Bagehotian,” reflect-
ing the importance of Walter Bagehot’s 1873 work Lombard
Street in formulating its central ideas. A second important his-
torical account of the Act is articulated by scholars of “Corpo-
rate Liberalism,” who contemplate the creation of lender-of-
last-resort powers through the lens of class conflict. According
to this account, the Act represents one of the leading exam-
ples for corporations’ use of the American state to entrench
the corporate economy.34
Circulation of Politics, Economics, and Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 975 (2011)
[hereinafter Kreitner, Money in the 1890s].
34. The literature on the origins of the Fed is vast and there are many
important accounts that do not fall clearly within either the Bagehotian or
Corporate Liberal frameworks. Some of the works that informed this Article
in particular include: ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS,
WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1877–1917, at 217–66 (1999); Perry
Mehrling, Retrospectives: Economists and the Fed: Beginnings, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Fall 2002, at 207; Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, Why Didn’t the United States
Establish a Central Bank Until After the Panic of 1907? (Fed. Res. Bank of At-
lanta Working Paper 99-16, 1999); Gerald T. Dunne, A Christmas Present for
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While both traditions—Bagehotian and Corporate Lib-
eral—offer important insights, both also fail to consider the
contemporaneous debate over credit distribution. Their neg-
lect of this debate is part of a broader inattention to the range
of alternatives available in the design of monetary institutions.
To bridge this gap, the Article builds on Christine Desan’s
Constitutional Approach to Money with its analysis of money as a
product of legal design and its strong distributive focus.35
A. The Bagehotian Tradition: Rationalizing Lender of Last Resort
In 1873, Walter Bagehot, an early editor-in-chief of The
Economist, wrote his famous advice to the directors of the Bank
of England (“BoE”).36 Bagehot’s advice—lend freely, against
good collateral and at a high rate—is a nearly universal idiom
in policy circles.37 It is of little surprise then that many of the
most influential financial historians view the Act as the belated
American creation of a Bagehot-style central bank.38
The context for the Bagehot rule is banks’ nature as
agents that expand the money supply through maturity trans-
formation. On the one hand, banks’ liabilities—bank depos-
its—are payable in cash on demand, which is a central feature
of their use as means of payment between depositors. On the
other hand, banks make their profits by holding the majority
the President: A Short History of the Creation of the Federal Reserve System, BUS.
HORIZONS, Winter 1963, at 43. Mary O’Sullivan’s work in 2016 on the call
market and its significance for the Act was published while this Article was
already at late stages. MARY A. O’SULLIVAN, DIVIDENDS OF DEVELOPMENT: SE-
CURITIES MARKETS IN THE HISTORY OF U.S. CAPITALISM, 1866–1922 (2016).
35. See DESAN, supra note 33.
36. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY
MARKET (Batoche Books 2001) (1873).
37. For an influential attempt to adapt the Bagehot rule to the condi-
tions of the modern financial system, see MEHRLING, supra note 11;
MEHRLING ET AL., supra note 7.
38. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, E. Gerald Corrigan & Alan Greenspan,
Panel Discussion: November 6, 2010, in THE ORIGINS, HISTORY, AND FUTURE OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE: A RETURN TO JEKYLL ISLAND 399, 408 (Michael D.
Bordo & William Roberds eds., 2013); CHARLES GOODHART, THE EVOLUTION
OF CENTRAL BANKS 6 (2d ed. 1988); ALLAN H. MELTZER, 1 A HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE, 1913–1951, at 65–66 (2003); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA
JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
1867–1960, at 192 (1963). But see FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra, for a senti-
ment of disapproval of speculation as important for section 13 of the Federal
Reserve Act.
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of their assets not in cash, but in the form of longer-term loans
and securities. This is a profitable business model because in-
terest earned on long-term loans is greater than interest paid
on demand deposits—which is low, and often zero.
The Bagehotian framework posits banks’ maturity mis-
matched structure functions tolerably well in ordinary times,
but it is susceptible to occasional panics or “bank runs.” If any
considerable portion of a bank’s depositors demand cash si-
multaneously, the bank could fail to meet its obligations as its
assets are tied to illiquid loans. The failure of a single bank can
breed unease among depositors, leading to widespread bank
runs.
A central concern of such bank runs is their susceptibility
to “self-fulfilling prophecies.” Even when a depositor believes
her particular bank to be solvent, she has a strong incentive to
withdraw her funds if she suspects other depositors will do the
same. This is because, once a bank exhausts its reserve of cash,
it must suspend payments. Suspension of payments is undesir-
able because it turns immediately available deposits into long-
term claims against the bank. It is therefore wise for the indi-
vidual depositor to withdraw whatever cash it can from the
bank rather than risk being too late.39
Bagehot’s advice to the BoE was that faced with crisis, the
BoE should act assertively as a lender of last resort. In other
words, the BoE should open its “discount window” and lend
freely against all collateral considered good in ordinary
times.40 When the BoE acted this way, it allowed banks to con-
vert otherwise illiquid assets (i.e., collateral used for borrow-
ing) into cash to meet depositors’ withdrawals. Depositors
would then be reassured that their banks were able to meet
demand for cash, quelling the panic.41
From this Bagehotian perspective, U.S. financial history in
the decades preceding the Act is a sequence of debilitating
banking panics. The fatal flaw of the U.S. monetary system was
its lack of an “elastic currency” that could expand and contract
39. For a discussion of bank runs, self-fulfilling prophecies and multiple
equilibria, see RICKS, supra note 7, at 53, 55, 62–73.
40. See BAGEHOT, supra note 36, at 21. As hinted above, the Bagehot dic-
tum has an additional component, which is that the central bank should
only make such lending available at a higher rate. Id. at 58.
41. Id. at 60.
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according to the needs of the economy.42 That inelastic cur-
rency produced occasional scarcities of cash that precipitated
bank runs. Most importantly, during the harvest season, farm-
ers at the periphery would need to increase their cash hold-
ings to pay “farm hands” to move the crops. The farmers
would draw cash from their local country banks. The local
country banks would draw cash from their large correspon-
dent banks in New York City. Before long, those large corre-
spondents would quickly run out of cash; naturally, a general
panic followed.43
FIGURE 2: A RUN ON THE BANK (HARPER’S MAGAZINE,
FEBRUARY 1890)
Picture taken from HARPERS, https://harpers.org/blog/2014/03/sins-of-the-fat-
cat/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
42. Under the National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as
amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C.), national banks were authorized
to issue national bank notes (Section 21), but only against government
bonds deposited in the U.S. Treasury. Contemporaries often complained the
issuance of those notes was cumbersome and unprofitable, hence they were
notoriously “inelastic.” For a general discussion of national bank notes, see
FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 16–23.
43. The 1907 panic included an additional dimension of complexity due
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The problem was that the United States lacked an en-
tity—like the BoE—that could lend to banks against their as-
sets.44 In the absence of such lender of last resort, the rational
course of action for individual actors was to run on their banks
and hoard as much cash before others beat them to it.
Bagehotian historians understand Americans’ failure to
establish a central bank despite the enormous costs of panics
as part of the controversial legacy of the Second Bank of the
United States (1816–1836). The Second Bank became marred
with corruption and capture by financial elites.45 Many Ameri-
cans feared that history would repeat itself. In the Bagehotian
tradition, the Act, thus, represents overcoming this fear.46
to the role of trust companies. See Jon Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, The Bank
Panic of 1907: The Role of Trust Companies, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 611, 612, 617, 621
(1992) [hereinafter Moen & Tallman, The Bank Panic of 1907]. The initial
trigger for that panic was the failed attempt by a speculator closely associated
with the banking business (Augustus Heinze) to corner the stock of the
United Copper Company. See Ellis W. Tallman & Jon R. Moen, Lessons from
the Panic of 1907, ECON. REV., May/June 1990, at 4.
44. The U.S. Treasury and the New York Clearing House Association
(“NYCHA”) provided some forms of lending of last resort, but those were
too limited to provide a complete solution. See, e.g., 1 MARGARET G. MYERS,
THE NEW YORK MONEY MARKET: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 426–28 (1931);
DAVID KINLEY, THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY OF THE U.S AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE BANKS OF THE COUNTRY 268–72 (1910). For NYCHA clearinghouse
loan certificates, see J.G. CANNON, CLEARING-HOUSE METHODS AND PRACTICES
75, 117 (1910).
45. For a nuanced discussion of the controversy surrounding the Second
Bank of the United States, see Bray Hammond, Jackson, Biddle, and the Bank
of the United States, 7 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1947).
46. Friedman and Schwartz famously indicted the Fed with failure to ful-
fill its mission as a lender of last resort during the Great Depression. See
FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 299–419. Nevertheless, most finan-
cial historians see the creation of the Fed as a major step towards calming
the previously chaotic U.S. financial system, and one that contributed to the
long “quiet period” between the New Deal and the Global Financial Crisis.
The other pillar of financial stability during this era is the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. See Banking Act of 1933 (Glass–Steagall Act), Pub. L.
No. 73-66, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933); Banking Act of 1935, Pub L. No. 74-
305, § 1, 49 Stat. 684 (1935).
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B. The Corporate Liberal Tradition: Lender of Last Resort as
Class Conflict
Historians associated with the Corporate Liberal school
offer a very different account of the determinants of the Act.
This school, a branch of the broad field of history of American
capitalism, focuses on the relationship between state power
and the rise of the modern corporate system during the Pro-
gressive Era and the New Deal. It grew out of disagreement
with the “consensus history” of the post-war period.47
To consensus historians like Richard Hofstadter, Arthur
Schlesinger, and Louis Harz, the rise of the regulatory state
reflected a tension between liberalism and corporate power.
Liberal reformers, in other words, created regulatory agencies
as part of their commitment to restrain the excesses of corpo-
rate power. Dissatisfied with this thesis, Corporate Liberal his-
torians, including Gabriel Kolko and James Weinstein, reinter-
preted the relationship between regulatory reforms and corpo-
rations.48 Instead of curbing corporate power, they posited
that Progressive Era and New Deal reforms promoted its rise
and entrenchment.49
James Livingston’s Origins of the Federal Reserve System:
Money Class, and Corporate Capitalism 1890–1913 is a particularly
influential Corporate Liberal reading of the Act.50 Livingston’s
thesis is that the Act was the result of a campaign led by corpo-
rate financiers who hoped to harness the central bank to stabi-
lize securities markets. This article builds on Livingston’s in-
sight to relate the origins of the Fed to the rise of corporate
power, while also departing from his thesis in significant ways.
The following paragraphs discuss three themes of Livingston’s
work that are particularly noteworthy for present purposes: (1)
the political controversy surrounding the modern corpora-
tion; (2) the 1890s debates on the monetary standard; and (3)
the relationship between the monetary system and the capital
47. My discussion of corporate liberal historiography draws on Eli Cook,
When Liberalism Went Corporate: The Evolution of the Corporate Liberal
Historiography (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
48. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETA-
TION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916 (1967); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE COR-
PORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE (Praeger 1981).
49. See, e.g., KOLOKO, supra note 48, at 3.
50. LIVINGSTON, supra note 27.
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market.51 The first theme concerns one of the great political
controversies of the Postbellum period. To many Americans
the rise of the modern business corporation represented a
threat to the tradition of small “r” republicanism.52 This tradi-
tion was one of small proprietorship, self-employment, and
competition between small producers, and it was central to the
identity of many Americans throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury. As Livingston explains, these small producers were “more
interested in maintaining their standing as freeholders than in
enlarging their claims on income and property. This is of
course what Marx called . . . simple market society: it involves a
market in products but not in labor.”53
By the late nineteenth-century, that tradition was severely
threatened. An increasing share of economic activity was dom-
inated by large corporations. These corporations increasingly
came to exercise greater market power over their respective
sectors (e.g., railroads, steel, oil, farm equipment, rubber,
sugar, and tobacco). The entrenchment of corporate market
power raised the issue of concentration that underlies so much
of the development of modern corporate law.54
From the perspective of corporate leaders, the turn to
concentration resulted from the inadequacy of the competi-
tive price mechanism under the new industrial age. The no-
tion of “self-regulating” competition relies on producers’ abil-
ity to flexibly adjust supply to meet demand. That is, for the
price mechanism to work, producers must be able to adjust
the quantities they produce based on prevailing prices.
Rapid industrialization, however, required firms to make
large outlays of fixed capital—like plants and equipment—far
in advance of sales. Faced with declining prices, firms could
not recoup their fixed investment costs by lowering supply
(factories and rail lines were already built). Instead, these
firms ironically had to cut prices even further to increase their
market share. The result was “overproduction” and “ruinous
competition” between firms that led to mass bankruptcies and
coincided with the Long Depression that lasted between 1873
51. Livingston’s book is exceptionally rich and meticulously researched.
The discussion that follows cannot do justice to this important work.
52. LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at 33–70.
53. Id. at 92–93.
54. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65–108 (1992).
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and 1896. Corporate concentration emerged as the antidote to
these problems.55 A key insight Livingston offers in this con-
text is to situate the Act within the broader controversy over
corporate power. Contemporaries’ views on the creation of a
central bank were influenced by their broader stance on cor-
porate power and the ways they believed the creation of a cen-
tral bank would affect corporate power.
FIGURE 3: THE STATUTE OF LIBERTY COVERED IN
TRUST POSTERS (1889)
Picture taken from NEW INDEPENDENT WHIG, https://newindependentwhig.
blogspot.com/2012/07/on-liberty-enlightening-world.html (last visited Feb.
25, 2018).
55. LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at 51–53. See also Hyman Minsky,
Schumpeter and Finance, in MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PAULO SYLOS LABINI 109 (Salvatore Biasco et al.
eds., 1992).
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A second relevant theme in Livingston’s analysis is the in-
tense debate about the monetary standard in the 1890s.56
Prior to the Civil War, the United States had a bimetallic stan-
dard, meaning that both gold and silver could be freely
minted by the U.S. mint into legal tender according to ratios
established (and occasionally recalibrated) by law.57 During
that period, bank deposits, bank notes, and government debt
were ultimately convertible into gold and silver coin. The Civil
War brought a suspension of this standard, replacing it with
inconvertible paper money known as “greenbacks.”58 When
Congress resumed the metallic standard in the late 1870s, only
gold—not silver—could be freely minted into legal tender.59
The United States thus effectively joined the international
“gold standard.”60
The gold standard coincided with a long period of mone-
tary deflation (i.e., a decrease in the price level). The decline
in the price of agricultural commodities and the burden of
fixed mortgage payments meant that farmers were particularly
hit hard by deflation.61 In the 1890s, agrarian frustration re-
sulted in the Populist Party campaign to expand the money
supply through the reminting of silver. Such increase, agrari-
ans believed, could bring prices back up to their traditional
level. This “free silver” campaign divided the Democratic Party
between the “Silverite” Populist wing, and the mainstream
“Gold Democrat” camp, committed to the gold standard. The
Populist wing triumphed when William Jennings Bryan won
56. LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at 71–128.
57. See, e.g., Coinage Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 246 (1792); Coinage Act of 1834,
4 Stat. 699 (1834); Coinage Act of 1853, 10 Stat. 160 (1853). For actual
amounts of gold and silver coin minted, see DICKSON H. LEAVENS, SILVER
MONEY 21 (1939).
58. See Legal Tender Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 345 (1862); see also Knox v. Lee,
79 U.S. 457 (1871).
59. For restrictions on minting of silver, see Coinage Act of 1873, ch. 131,
§ 21, 17 Stat. 424. Resumption took place later in 1879, with the Treasury
standing ready to redeem greenbacks for coin on demand. See Specie Pay-
ment Resumption Act of 1875, ch. 15, 18 Stat. 296 (1875).
60. For discussion of the gold standard and related legal aspects, see Roy
Kreitner, The Jurisprudence of Global Money, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW
177 (2010).
61. As Kreitner recounts, from 1866 to 1894 the price of wheat declined
from $3.00 to $0.56 a bushel. Kreitner, Money in the 1890s, supra note 33, at
978.
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the presidential nomination at the Democratic National Con-
vention, although he ultimately lost in the 1896 general elec-
tion.62
Like the Gold Democrats, corporate financiers strongly
opposed the Populists’ free silver agenda. According to Living-
ston, corporate financiers’ opposition was rooted in two con-
cerns. First, while Populists focused on money’s role in facili-
tating present production and consumption, corporate finan-
ciers’ priorities lay with money’s role in enabling the
accumulation of capital across time. Capital market securi-
ties—stocks and bonds—moved purchasing power away from
investors with surplus funds and into the hands of corpora-
tions that made real investments.63 Corporate financiers in-
sisted that changes in the monetary standard would under-
mine investors’ confidence and threaten the functioning of
the capital market.64 Corporate financiers also believed that
monetary expansion would put more money in the hands of
small producers, thus exacerbating the problems of overpro-
duction and ruinous competition.65 Livingston’s key insight
here is in considering the Act as a follow-up chapter in the
history of the political debate over the monetary standard.
A third and final relevant theme from Livingston’s work is
the relationship between the capital market and the monetary
system on the eve of the Act. According to Livingston, the im-
petus for the Act was corporate financiers’ efforts to protect
the capital market from monetary instability.66 At the time,
one of the key threats to the capital market came from harvest
strains when agrarian needs overwhelmed New York banks
with demands for cash to move crops. By the early 1900s, coun-
try banks transformed the way they held their balances in New
York, destabilizing the capital market even further.
In addition to holding balance with large New York corre-
spondent banks, country banks began holding part of their
62. Nearly two decades later, tensions between the former Gold Demo-
crat and Populist camps continued to reverberate in the debates over the
Federal Reserve Act. See infra Part III.
63. LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at 93–94.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 100–01.
66. See id. at 137–44, 155–58, 161–62, 178, 187.
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balances as call loans.67 Call loans are overnight loans made to
brokers on the NYSE. NYSE brokers used these loans to fi-
nance securities purchased for their speculative customers.
Come harvest, when the country banks’ demand for cash in-
creased, they would abruptly call back loans from brokers. The
sudden shortage of funds would make interest rates on call
loans rapidly increase. To repay the loans, brokers would liqui-
date their customers’ positions en masse. The fire sales led to
steep declines in securities’ prices and general chaos in the
capital market. Once harvest season was over, the flow of funds
reversed. Brokers were glutted with loans from country banks
and interest rates on call loans dropped to very low levels
again.
According to Livingston’s analysis, corporate financiers
campaigned for the creation of a lender of last resort to allevi-
ate strains from the call loan market. A lender of last resort
would be able to increase the supply of cash during harvest,
and contract it when that cash was no longer necessary. Then,
the call loan market would be insulated from the boom–bust
dynamic of the harvest that was increasingly threatening the
health of the capital market. In this way, Livingston’s work
adds an important dimension to the conventional narrative.
According to him, the creation of a lender of last resort was
not merely an attempt to increase financial stability for the
benefit of all. Instead, it was part of a broader agenda to use
state power—the central bank—to stabilize and promote the
corporate system against the embattled republican order.
C. The Constitutional Approach: Lender of Last Resort and the
Unit of Account
The Bagehotian and Corporate Liberal accounts each
provide important insights into the genesis of the Fed. How-
ever, the narratives they offer, even when taken together, re-
main incomplete. Bagehotian historians correctly acknowl-
edge the centrality of financial panics in the development of
lender-of-last-resort powers, but they omit any meaningful po-
litical or distributive stakes. In turn, Corporate Liberal histori-
67. Id. at 144, 155–56, 178. A related, but distinct development was the
rise of trust companies as major lenders to brokers. See Moen & Tallman, The
Bank Panic of 1907, supra note 43. See also LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at
139–40.
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ans usefully locate lender-of-last-resort power within the
broader controversy over corporate capitalism. The Fed, how-
ever, is so closely identified with corporate interests in the nar-
rative that there is no consideration of the meaningful public
debate over the design of lender-of-last-resort powers.68
A full account must address the distributive choices inher-
ently involved in enacting foundational monetary reforms like
lender-of-last-resort authority. Christine Desan’s The Constitu-
tional Approach to Money (“Constitutional Approach”) provides a
useful framework for analyzing such distributive choices.69 Her
Constitutional Approach conceives of the monetary system—like
the financial activity it enables—as an object of governance.
Desan critiques the widespread view that money arises sponta-
neously from private barter. Instead, she argues, collective or
group decisions are essential to creating and maintaining
money.70 At the most basic level, Desan shows that collectives,
68. Thus, Livingston argues that partisan lines made little difference in
the way legislators approached the creation of a central bank in the years
leading up to 1913 as all parties’ positions were ultimately “the invention” of
the corporate vision to “remake American banking in the image of the new
corporate economy.” LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at 215. For critiques of this
thesis, see SANDERS, supra note 34, at 238; Gerald Berk, Corporate Liberalism
Reconsidered: A Review Essay, 3 J. POL’Y HIST. 70 (1991). It is interesting to
note that side by side with Livingston’s overarching narrative on corporate
dominance, his work powerfully reveals instances where competing distribu-
tive agendas did in fact translate into legislative battles. Consider, for exam-
ple, his discussion of the 1908 Aldrich Vreeland Act and debates over the
definition of acceptable collateral for the issuance of emergency currency.
LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at 183–87.
69. DESAN, supra note 33; Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Approach
to Money: Monetary Design and the Production of the Modern World, in MONEY
TALKS: EXPLAINING HOW MONEY REALLY WORKS 109 (Nina Bandelj et al. eds.,
2017) [hereinafter Desan, The Constitutional Approach to Money]; Christine A.
Desan, The Monetary Structure of Economic Activity, in INSIDE MONEY: RE-THEO-
RIZING LIQUIDITY (Christine A. Desan ed., forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter
Desan, The Monetary Structure]. As Desan explains, the “constitutional” in the
“constitutional approach” refers to the foundational way in which monetary
arrangements define public authority, its relationship to individuals, and the
way individuals relate to one another. Desan, The Constitutional Approach to
Money, supra, at 111, 115. Sometimes, these arrangements are made through
the Constitution, but often they are made in other branches of law, includ-
ing private law, regulatory practice, and international law.
70. See Desan The Constitutional Approach to Money, supra note 69, at
112–121.
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rather than individuals, decide how to define the monetary
unit of account (e.g., the U.S. dollar).
A dollar is, at its root, legally defined. The idea that banks
must stand ready to redeem deposits in cash only finds logic
where there is some legal definition of cash. This is often re-
ferred to as “legal tender”—the power to redeem debt denom-
inated in the unit of account.71 Collective decisions create a
supply of cash by endowing certain assets as legal tender. And
collective decisions generate demand for cash by levying pub-
lic obligations—taxes—and by enforcing private obligations in
legal tender.72
As Desan’s legal history of money demonstrates, collec-
tives have great flexibility in defining what assets are legal
tender, or would be easily convertible into legal tender. The
decision to impart this quality on particular assets at the exclu-
sion of others has distributive consequences. After all, the law
grants these assets with a legal power that other assets lack:
they can redeem debt. Demand for these assets, thus, becomes
greater, raising their value and encouraging the economic ac-
tivities to which they relate.73 As Desan shows in her work—
and as we will explore below—different people will be posi-
tioned differently to benefit from these activities. In this way,
71. The term “legal tender” deserves clarification as different authors
employ it in different ways. I use the term to denote the fact that the law
recognizes that a certain instrument has the power to redeem debt in a given
transaction. Defined this way, “legal tender” need not be universal: an instru-
ment may work as legal tender to redeem some forms of debt but not others.
The famous greenbacks are a case in point. Under section 1 of the 1862
Legal Tender Act, these notes were legal tender to all debts, public or pri-
vate, except payments of customs to the government, and interest on the pub-
lic debt from the government. Legal Tender Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 345
(1862). Similarly, transfers of commercial bank deposits today enjoy broad
powers of redeeming debt between bank depositors, but not between banks,
or from banks to depositors. For discussion of these themes, see Nadav
Orian Peer, A Constitutional Approach to Shadow Banking: The Early
Shadow System 21–26 (2016) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law
School) (on file with author).
72. DESAN, supra note 33, at 24, 78–83 (discussing public and private pay-
ments, respectively).
73. See Desan, The Constitutional Approach to Money, supra note 69, at
113–117 (discussing the “cash premium”).
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defining the unit of account presents society with first order
questions on the character their economy is going to take.74
The insights of Desan’s Constitutional Approach are directly
relevant to lender-of-last-resort powers. When the central bank
agrees to lend against particular types of collateral, it essen-
tially converts that collateral into legal tender that can be used
in payment. The Act authorized the Fed to issue “Federal Re-
serve notes” based on its loans (or “discounts”) to member
banks.75 When lending to banks, the Fed therefore allowed
them to transform their illiquid collateral into newly issued
Federal Reserve notes. According to section 16 of the Act,
these Federal Reserve notes were “obligations of the United
States . . . receivable by all national and member banks and
Federal reserve banks and for all taxes, customs, and other
public dues.”76 Banks could also use these notes to satisfy their
regulatory reserve requirements.77 Thus, the Act made Federal
Reserve notes legal tender for the most important payments in
the economy.78
The notes themselves, it is important to mention, were
still convertible into gold coin, and a provision in the Act ex-
plicitly reaffirmed the gold definition of the dollar.79 However,
the legal tender status of Federal Reserve notes for public
taxes, national bank debt, and bank reserves made it all but
certain that domestic users would gladly accept them in pay-
ment of debt, and had little incentive to redeem them for
coin.80 Furthermore, while the Act required the Fed to main-
74. DESAN, supra note 33, at 24. See also Desan, The Monetary Structure,
supra note 69.
75. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 16, 38 Stat. 251
(1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522 (2006)).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 19. However, part of the required reserve had to be kept in bal-
ances held with the Fed directly. Either way, a bank could always deposit
Federal Reserve notes with the Fed to acquire the necessary balances.
78. For my use of the term “legal tender,” see the discussion in Orian
Peer, supra note 71. Under the current provisions of the U.S. Code, Federal
Reserve notes today constitute legal tender for all debts, public and private.
See 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012). The Fed does not need to redeem the notes in
any other form of money.
79. Federal Reserve Act of 1913 § 26.
80. I am referring here to domestic users, as opposed to international
investors and foreign exchange arbitrageurs. The incentives of these actors
are important, of course, but they should not detract from the large domes-
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tain a gold reserve against its notes, that reserve was partial
(40%) and subject to considerable flexibility.81 After all, as its
preamble declares, the Act was explicitly designed to “furnish
an elastic currency.” This elasticity was achieved precisely by
having the power to issue paper money only partially backed
by a gold reserve.
FIGURE 4: FEDERAL RESERVE NOTES (1914) CONSTITUTED
LEGAL TENDER IN PAYMENT TO THE TREASURY,
NATIONAL BANKS, AND THE
FEDERAL RESERVE
Picture taken from WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Re
serve_Note#/media/File:US-$5-FRN-1914-Fr-832a.jpg (last visited Feb. 28,
2018).
This Article, in sum, builds on Desan’s Constitutional Ap-
proach by identifying lender-of-last-resort reform as an instance
where the monetary unit of account itself is redefined. This
moment entails a choice between different ways of redefining
the unit of account, namely, deciding on the different collater-
als that will be eligible for lender-of-last-resort support. In the
tic demand that is created for instruments with legal tender status. See also
DESAN, supra note 33, at 406.
81. For the 40% gold reserve requirement, see Federal Reserve Act of
1913 § 16. Section 11(c) authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to suspend
reserve requirements. The scope of the discretion is broad, though its use
subjects the Fed to a tax on reserve deficiencies. Id. § 11(c).
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remainder of the Article, we move to examine how each one
of the three contemporary groups—mainstream Democrats,
agrarians, and corporate financiers—tried to shape the defini-
tion of eligibility to promote its access to credit.
II.
THE URBAN-COMPETITIVE AGENDA
By 1912, the Populist wing of the Democratic Party,
though still influential, had lost its leadership position.82 With
Woodrow Wilson’s nomination at the Democratic National
Convention, the old Gold Democrat wing that opposed the
“free silver” campaigns of the previous decades resumed con-
trol of the party.83 Despite their conservative support of the
gold standard, these mainstream Democrats adopted a firm
anti-corporate stance. Therefore, the Urban-Competitive
Agenda of mainstream Democrats managed to simultaneously
deride the political project of Populism, while nevertheless ap-
pealing to the shared values of small-scale entrepreneurship,
economic independence, and producerism, all in the context
of the embattled republican tradition.
The “Urban-Competitive Agenda” thus refers to the sum
of views and commitments held by mainstream (as opposed to
Populist) Democrats: men like President Wilson, Louis Bran-
deis (Wilson’s political advisor and later Supreme Court nomi-
nee), Representative Carter Glass (Chair of the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency and co-sponsor of the Act),
Henry Parker Willis (Committee Expert and one of its main
drafters), and Samuel Untermeyer (counsel of the influential
Pujo Committee).84 Pet peeves and turf battles demonstrate
82. Bryan won the nomination (but lost the elections) in 1900 and 1908.
ROBERT W. CHERNY, A RIGHTEOUS CAUSE: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS
BRYAN 87, 111 (1985). In 1904, the nominee was Alton Parker, who sup-
ported the gold standard. Id. at 99.
83. See RICHARD J. JENSEN, THE WINNING OF THE MIDWEST: SOCIAL AND PO-
LITICAL CONFLICT, 1888–1896, at 307 n.63 (1971).
84. I am intentionally leaving out of this list Democrats from the Populist
or Bryanite wings. Their agenda differed from the Wilson camp and was
sometimes (though not always) closer to the regional development vision.
See infra Part III. For a rich history of the negotiations between the Bryan and
Wilson wings over the Act, see Dunne, supra note 34. Samuel Untermyer was
politically closer to the Bryanite wing but his views on credit distribution, I
believe, sat comfortably with the Wilsonians.
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that even within the mainstream Democratic camp, these men
clearly did not possess a unified worldview.85 And yet, the Ur-
ban-Competitive Agenda was broader than their sensitivities as
individuals. The agenda was the party’s platform and the
party’s face to the public and it powerfully animated the terms
on which the Act was designed and debated.
This Part begins by describing mainstream Democrats’
anti-corporate politics (Section A) and the ways these politics
manifested in their assault of the call loan market (Section B).
It then moves on to the role of the assault on the call loan
market in the design of the Act (Section C).
A. Democrats’ Anti-Corporate Politics
The 1912 election campaign brought the debate over the
modern corporation to the fore, with each of the main con-
tenders—the Democratic, Progressive, and Republican par-
ties—articulating a different role for the corporation in the
U.S. economy.86 Influenced by the ideas of Louis Brandeis, the
Democratic Party platform derided private monopolies as “in-
defensible and intolerable” and demanded new legislation for
their complete elimination.87 Opposing the Democrats, Theo-
dore Roosevelt’s new Progressive Party accepted that “[t]he
concentration of modern business, in some degree, is both in-
evitable and necessary for national and international business
efficiency.”88 Instead of breaking the trusts, Progressives called
for their regulation through new administrative commissions.
Incumbent, President Taft, and the Republicans called for
more vigorous prosecution of corporate abuses through the
Sherman Antitrust Act but also accepted their permanent
85. For an example of the tensions between Glass and Untermyer, see
Edward J. Stevens, The Founders’ Intentions: Sources of the Payment Services
Franchise of the Federal Reserve Banks (Fed. Res. Fin. Serv., Working Paper No.
03-96, 1996). See also Henry Parker Willis, The Federal Reserve Act, 4 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 17 (1914); SAMUEL UNTERMYER, WHO IS ENTITLED TO THE CREDIT FOR
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT?: AN ANSWER TO SENATOR CARTER GLASS (1927).
86. See William Kolasky, The Election of 1912: A Pivotal Moment in Antitrust
History, 25 ANTITRUST 82 (2011).
87. 1912 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 25,
1912), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29590.
88. Progressive Party Platform of 1912, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 5,
1912), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29617.
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role.89 With the Republican vote split between Taft and
Roosevelt’s new Progressive Party, the Democrats’ firm anti-
corporate stance won by a landslide.
The Act, signed into law on December 1913, was part of
the broader package of policies advanced by the Democrats to
pursue decentralization and the return to competition.
Dubbed as the “New Freedom,” this package included a num-
ber of big-ticket items. The earlier Revenue Act of 1913 rein-
stated the income tax and substantially reduced the tariff that
protected corporations from international competition.90 The
later Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 was an attempt to prevent
anticompetitive practices at their incipiency.91 Earlier in 1913,
Wilson himself alluded to the close relationship between mon-
etary reform and competition while addressing a joint session
of Congress to compel legislative action on the Act. He argued
that “[i]t is absolutely imperative that we should give the busi-
ness men of this country a banking and currency system by
means of which they can make use of the freedom of enter-
prise and of individual initiative which we are about to bestow
upon them.”92
The ideological glue joining together the New Freedom
legislation also found its way into one of Clifford Berryman’s
caricatures (see Figure 5). The popular contemporary
cartoonist depicted Wilson trying to prime the “business pros-
perity pump,” pouring-in buckets of “Currency Legislation,”
“Antitrust Legislation,” and “Tariff Legislation.”93
89. Republican Party Platform of 1912, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 18,
1912), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29633.
90. Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
91. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. 63–212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012)).
92. Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the
Banking System, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 23, 1913), http://www.presi
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65369.
93. CLIFFORD KENNEDY BERRYRMAN, Priming, in BERRYMAN POLITICAL CAR-
TOON COLLECTION, 1896–1949, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN. (June 26,
1914), https://catalog.archives.gov/id/306143.
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FIGURE 5: MONETARY REFORM AS PART OF WILSON’S
“NEW FREEDOM” AGENDA
When applied in the context of money and banking,
Democrats’ anti-corporate stance translated into a critique of
the “money trust.” The money trust was a group of large New
York financial institutions that brought together large invest-
ment banks like J.P. Morgan & Co. and Khun, Loeb & Co. with
the largest NYCHA banks like National City and First National.
Democrats argued this group held effective control over the
distribution of industrial credit. They accused this group of us-
ing its control to channel credit to affiliated corporations like
U.S. Steel and General Electric while denying it from any pos-
sible competitors. While still Governor of New Jersey, Wilson
channeled this critique back in 1911:
The great monopoly in this country is the money mo-
nopoly. So long as that exists, our old variety and
freedom and individual energy of development are
out of the question. A great industrial nation is con-
trolled by its system of credit. Our system of credit is
concentrated. The growth of the nation, therefore,
and all our activities are in the hands of a few men,
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who, even if their actions be honest and intended for
the public interest, are necessarily concentrated
upon the great undertakings in which their own
money is involved and who, necessarily, by every rea-
son of their own limitations, chill and check and de-
stroy genuine economic freedom. This is the greatest
question of all; and to this, statesmen must address
themselves with an earnest determination to serve
the long future and the true liberties of men.94
By the 1912 election year, the Democrats, who won the
House in 1911, formed a congressional subcommittee to inves-
tigate the money trust known as the “Pujo Committee.”95 Testi-
monies from leading financiers and cross-examinations by the
committee’s counsel, Samuel Untermyer made the Pujo Com-
mittee a widely covered spectacle.96 In giant diagrams, Com-
mittee staff meticulously documented the web of ownership in-
terests and interlocking directorates that linked New York’s fi-
nancial institutions to each other and to the nation’s largest
corporations (see Figure 6). The Committee submitted its fi-
nal report in February 1913, just in time for the opening of the
all-Democratic sixty-third Congress. The report was an impor-
tant influence on the public debate and legislative hearings
over the Act that would be signed into law by the end of the
year.97
94. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 1 (1914). See also CARTER GLASS, AN ADVENTURE IN CONSTRUCTIVE FI-
NANCE 78–79 (1927).
95. Some Republicans also played an important role in the creation of
the subcommittee, most notably, Rep. Charles August Lindbergh (Minne-
sota), father of the famous aviator. In 1913, Lindbergh bitterly opposed the
Federal Reserve Act. See C.A. Lindbergh, Minority Views on the Glass Bill, in
HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE REPORT, H.R. 7837, 63d Cong.
(1913).
96. See Money Trust Investigation: Investigation of Financial and Monetary
Conditions in the United States Under House Resolutions Nos. 429 and 504 Before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives,
62d Cong. 1865–1974 (1912). The climax of the hearings was J. Pierpont
Morgan’s testimony in December 1912. Id. at 1003.
97. ARSÈNE PAULIN PUJO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PURSU-
ANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRA-
TION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593 (1913). See
S. REP. NO. 63-133, pt. 1, at 6003 (1913) (“The [Pujo Committee] hearings
were published in twenty-nine parts, consisting of thousands of pages, and
with a most illuminating report showing the existence, substantially, of a vast
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FIGURE 6: “BANKING INFLUENCE IN LARGE CORPORATIONS”:
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART FROM
THE PUJO COMMITTEE
ARSÈNE PAULIN PUJO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PURSUANT TO
HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRATION OF
CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, REP. NO. 1593, 62D CONG., 3D SESS. (1913),
Ex. No. 244, https://info.publicintelligence.net/PujoCommitteeReport.pdf.
B. Democrats’ Assault on the Call Loan Market
The Democrats’ critique of the money trust is complex
and multilayered. One aspect of this critique is especially rele-
vant for the legislative efforts on the Act: the fierce assault on
the call loan market. Again, call loans were short-term loans
made to brokers on the NYSE. Brokers used these short-term
loans to purchase corporate securities for their speculative cus-
tomers. The securities themselves were pledged as collateral to
secure those loans, such that customers could post a very small
“margin” of their own capital—say 20% of a security’s price—
and borrow the remaining through the broker.98
As discussed in Part I, the call loan market was notoriously
unstable. Modern and contemporary observers alike have thus
concentration of power in the hands of a few man over the credit system of
the United States.”). See also SANDERS, supra note 34, at 244.
98. See Orian Peer, supra note 7, for a description and analysis of the call
loan market.
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attributed the creation of the Federal Reserve to the need to
remedy that instability.99 While certainly correct, the focus on
instability ignores the ways in which those stability considera-
tions were intertwined with distributive concerns. To Demo-
crats, the problem posed by the call loan market was not
merely a matter of financial stability; it was the way in which
that market channeled credit away from small communities
and into the Money Trust.
By 1912, the call loan market was large. The Pujo Com-
mittee Report provides a conservative estimate of some $766
million.100 This figure represents almost 10% of the entire
amount of individual demand deposits outstanding through-
out the country at the time ($8323 million).101 Moreover, the
average rate charged on call loans was considerably lower than
the rate charged on banks’ direct lending to the economy.
Taking 1912 as an example, the average call rate was 3.42%,
while the rate on even the most highly regarded short-term
commercial paper was 4.58%, a sizeable spread of over 116 ba-
sis points.102 Figure 7 uses data included in the Senate hear-
99. See supra Section II.B; supra note 67 and accompanying text. See also
Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, Outside Lending in the NYC Call Loan Market
13 (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 14-08, 2014).
100. H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 45 (1913). The Pujo Committee figures do
not distinguish between loans to brokers that were due on demand-call
loans—and “time loans.” The distinction is not of great significance for our
current purposes, as even time loans to brokers were of rather short maturi-
ties.
101. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, ANN. REP. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY TO THE THIRD SESSION OF THE SIXTY-SECOND CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, DOC. NO. 2662, at 35–36 (3d Sess. 1912) [hereinafter COMP-
TROLLER]. This figure includes all demand deposits, from national banks as
well as states banks, trusts and private banks.
102. Calculations are based on the numbers in Banking and Currency: Hear-
ings on H.R. 7837 (S. 2639) Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 63d
Cong. 1374–77 (1913) [hereinafter Banking and Currency Hearing]. The
spread was calculated using the rate on “double name commercial paper
(choice, 60–90 days).” Contemporaries considered double name paper to be
highly safe and conservative, such that it reflects virtually no credit risk. The
average spread is even greater (133 basis points) when less conservative “sin-
gle name” commercial paper is taken for comparison (= 4.74% average rate
on single name commercial paper—3.42% average call loan rate). Given the
near risk-free nature of the double name paper, the spread owes almost en-
tirely to the “liquidity premium” of call loans. See infra Section II.C. All calcu-
lations of average annual rates are time weighted according to the dates pro-
vided in the Senate data.
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ings on the Act to plot the same spread during the half decade
prior to the Act. This data reveals an even larger average
spread of 160 basis points between the average call loan rate
(2.78%) and the average commercial paper rate (4.39%) over
the period.103 As contemporaries readily observed, the call
loan market was a source of abundant low-cost credit for in-
vestment in the securities of the giant corporations.104
FIGURE 7: ANNUAL AVERAGE NY INTEREST RATES (LEFT PANEL)
AND SPREADS (RIGHT PANEL)
Authors’ calculations are based on Banking and Currency: Hearings on H.R. 7837
(S.2639) Before the S. Committee on Banking and Currency, 63d Cong. 1374–77. See notes
102–103 for methodological discussion.
The Pujo Committee Report found that the group of insti-
tutions that formed the money trust held the power to “deter-
mine what constitutes satisfactory collateral” in the call loan
market.105 This naturally allowed those institutions to channel
103. Calculations are based on the data from Banking and Currency, supra
note 102, at 1374–77. This average excludes the panic year of 1907. During
that year, the average call loan rate spiked above the commercial paper rate.
Even with 1907 is re-introduced into the average, the spread is still a consid-
erable 130 basis points (= 4.81% average commercial paper rate—3.50% av-
erage call loan rate). Here again, the average spread is even higher (176
basis points) when single name commercial paper is taken for comparison
(= 4.55% average rate on single name commercial paper—2.79% average
call loan rate). All calculations of average annual rates are time-weighted
according to the Senate data.
104. See infra Section III.C of this article for a discussion of the way in
which the low call loan rate created financial incentives for speculators to
increase their investments in corporate securities.
105. H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 139 (1913). However, the Committee was
careful to qualify its argument. See id. For a modern critique of the Pujo
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credit to affiliated corporations and restrict access to potential
competitors. Writing for Harper’s Weekly just one month before
the Act’s passage, Louis Brandeis brought this way of thinking
to a popular audience. The article series, soon published as
the highly influential Other People’s Money and How the Bankers
Use It, merits quotation at some length:
When bonds and stocks are issued to finance perma-
nently these corporations, the bank deposits can in
large part be loaned by the investment bankers in
control to themselves and their associates; so that se-
curities may be carried [i.e., funded] by them until
sold to investors. Or these bank deposits may be
loaned to allied bankers, or jobbers [i.e., brokers] in
securities, or to speculators, to enable them to carry
[i.e., fund through call loans] the bonds or stocks
. . . . The control by the leading investment bankers
over the banks and trust companies is so great, that
they can often determine for a time the market for
money by lending or refusing to lend on the Stock
Exchange. In this way, among others, they have
power to affect the general trend of prices in bonds
and stocks. Their power over a particular security is
even greater. Its sale on the market may depend
upon whether the security is favored or discriminated
against when offered to the banks and trust compa-
nies, as collateral for loans.106
Democrats’ assault on the call market went hand-in-hand
with a commitment to channel those funds employed in the
call loan market back to the communities “to which they be-
long.”107 The notion of call loan credit being wrongly appro-
priated from those communities was a recurring theme. It was
evoked by Democrats ranging from the deeply anti-corporate
Untermyer (Pujo Committee counsel), to the more conserva-
tive Representatives Carter Glass and Henry Parker Willis at
Committee’s thesis on money trust control of the call market, see
O’SULLIVAN, supra note 34, at 217–66.
106. Louis D. Brandeis, Breaking the Money Trust, Part 1 — Our Financial
Oligarchy, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Nov. 22, 1913, at 10, 12–13. See also BRANDEIS,
supra note 94.
107. Carter Glass, The Opposition to the Federal Reserve Bank Bill, in 4 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 18
(1913).
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the House Banking and Currency Committee.108 But how, one
might well ask, did funds from peripheral communities find
their way into the financial metropole in the first place? To
answer this question, we must look into the mechanics of bank
reserves during the national bank era, from 1863 to 1913.
Those same mechanics are responsible for the abnormally low
rates that call loans enjoyed as compared to banks’ direct com-
mercial lending (Figure 7).109
The National Bank Act, passed during the Civil War, codi-
fied a structure known as the “pyramiding of reserves.”110 The
thousands of small national banks throughout the country
were required to maintain a 15% reserve against their depos-
its. A small portion of these reserves (6%) had to be kept in
vault.111 The larger portion (9%), however, could be kept as
deposits with correspondent banks in larger “reserve cities”
like Boston, San Francisco, and Detroit.112 In turn, banks in
the sixty or so reserve cities were required to maintain a 25%
reserve ratio: one half (12.5%) in vault, and the remaining as
deposits further up the pyramid, in one of three “Central Re-
serve Cities.” New York functioned as the chief central reserve
city, with Chicago and St. Louis lagging far behind.113 Thus,
108. See id. See also Henry Parker Willis, The Federal Reserve Act, 4 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 20 (1914); Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 919, 1292
(1918) (statement of Samuel Untermyer, counsel of the Pujo Committee).
See also H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 158–59.
109. The Pujo Committee Report suggested the call rate was effectively
controlled by the money trust. H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 139. However, as
discussed below, there are additional institutional explanations to account
for the low average level of the call rate, most notably the high liquidity of
call loans.
110. See National Bank Act of 1864, Ch. 106, §§ 31–32, 13 Stat. 99 (codi-
fied as amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C.). See also MYERS, supra note
44, at 226–30.
111. Reserves had to be maintained in “lawful money”—primarily coin
and legal tender notes (greenbacks). National bank notes did not qualify as
lawful money. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 21.
112. National Bank Act of 1864 § 31. The original National Bank Act des-
ignated only twenty or so reserve cities. Other cities were designated follow-
ing later amendments to the act. See National Bank Act, S. 216, 66th Cong.
(1920).
113. National Bank Act of 1864 § 32 (Originally, New York was the sole
central reserve city. Chicago and St. Louis were designated following later
amendments to the act. See COMPTROLLER, supra note 101, at 70–71); MYERS,
supra note 44, at 241. It is important to note that under the National Bank
Act, country bank funds held directly with a New York correspondent
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New York national banks came to hold hundreds of millions in
deposits owed to other banks throughout the country. These
deposits were known as “bankers’ balances” and Democrats
were determined to abolish them.114
New York’s position at the pinnacle of the reserve pyra-
mid reflected—and sustained—its position at the pinnacle of
the national payments system. Experience showed that out-of-
town banks typically kept bankers’ balances in New York well
above their reserve requirements.115 Their key motivation in
doing so was that out-of-town banks could use bankers’ bal-
ances to make their inter-regional payments.116 New York, in
effect, was acting as the nation’s clearinghouse, and that
unique role made bank bankers’ balances held in New York
particularly attractive.117
As part of their day-to-day activities, banks need to make
very large payments to each other. Clearinghouses are institu-
tions that banks use to facilitate the collection of those very
large payments.118 On the eve of the Act, the U.S. financial
system had some 242 clearinghouses.119 The activities of most
(rather than a mid-tier Reserve City bank) also qualified for reserve status.
Id. at 241–42. See also infra Section III.C.
114. Classical works on bankers’ balances and their enormous significance
include MYERS, supra note 44, and LEONARD L. WATKINS, BANKERS’ BALANCES:
A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ON BANKING RELA-
TIONSHIPS (1929).
115. See MYERS, supra note 44, at 331–35.
116. According to some contemporaries, a 2% interest rate on bankers’
balances was another factor in attracting those balances. In her classical
work, Myers was skeptical of the claim. Id. at 249–50. Her skepticism is sup-
ported by the fact that rates on loans at out-of-town banks’ communities of
origin were typically much greater than 2%. See id. at 332. See also Banking
and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 1949 (statement of Frank A. Vander-
lip). Finally, another consideration for out-of-town banks maintaining addi-
tional bankers’ balances in excess of reserve requirements was securing
credit lines with New York correspondents. See Epilogue infra Part IV.
117. In the language of Section I.C, we may therefore speak of New York
bankers’ balances as a kind of de facto “legal tender” for inter-regional bank
payments. For New York’s rise as an inter-regional clearinghouse, see John
A. James & David F. Weiman, From Drafts to Checks: The Evolution of Correspon-
dent Banking Networks and the Formation of the Modern U.S. Payments System,
1850–1914, 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 237 (2010).
118. For a discussion of clearinghouses, see Orian Peer, supra note 71, at
17–26. For an early twentieth-century classic, see CANNON, supra note 44.
119. ARSÈNE PAULIN PUJO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PURSU-
ANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRA-
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of these clearinghouses, however, were of a rather local na-
ture. They cleared the payments of banks in their towns and
cities, or at most, within their regions. To clear payments
across regions, banks had to turn to New York. Take, for exam-
ple, a bank in Boston wishing to make a payment to a Chicago
bank. The easiest way to make the payment would be for both
of these banks to keep a correspondent account in New York.
The Boston bank could then instruct its correspondent to
transfer bankers’ balances to the account of the Chicago
bank’s New York Correspondent.
The New York correspondents that kept these bankers’
balances were typically members of the NYCHA. By 1910, $445
million out of around $650 million in bankers’ balances were
further concentrated within the “Big Six” NYCHA banks.120
According to the National Bank Act, the NYCHA banks had to
maintain only 25% of those balances in reserve.121 The re-
maining could be lent to their customers; and lend they did.
Most of this lending the NYCHA made to the NYSE brokers,
some $526 million.122
From the perspective of the NYCHA banks, call loans had
unique advantages. The bankers’ balances of out-of-town
banks were particularly volatile. Out-of-town banks routinely
used these balances to make payments and to supply them-
selves with cash as necessary. Having the ability to call back
loans from brokers (call loans were due on demand) afforded
the NYCHA banks greater liquidity to manage those demands.
The arrangement worked tolerably well in ordinary times, be-
cause NYCHA bank could simply shift call loans among them-
selves.123 But when country banks attempted to redeem bank-
ers’ balances en masse, the NYCHA banks as a group came
TION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 18
(1913).
120. MYERS, supra note 44, at 248. Four of the “Big Six” banks were related
to the money trust: National City, First National, National Bank of Com-
merce, and Chase National. The other two banks were National Park and
Hanover. See Moen & Tallman, supra note 99, at 278.
121. National Bank Act of 1864 § 31, 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
122. H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 45 (explaining that NYCHA banks carried
approximately $766 million in call loans, minus $240 million which they lent
for the account of out-of-town banks. Note that NYCHA banks also had a
local deposit base, and could have used part of those deposits to fund call
loans as well).
123. For discussion and analysis, see Orian Peer, supra note 7.
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under pressure, and suspended their redemptions.124 This was
how a panic unfolded.
The key point to appreciate here is that the Democratic
assault on call loans reflected more than a concern with the
financial risks posed by that market. By redesigning the struc-
ture of bank reserves and payments, the architects of the Act
hoped to shift that large amount of bankers’ balances away
from the call loan market and back to their communities of
origin. So much so, that in the midst of the public debate
around the bill, Democrats framed the opposition to the bill
precisely in these terms. The fight by the opponents, wrote
Carter Glass in a particularly polemic piece,
[I]s to drive us from our firm resolution to break
down the artificial connection between the banking
business of this country and the stock speculative op-
erations at the money centers . . . the banking and
currency committee of the House has gone to the
very root of this gigantic evil, and in this bill proposes
to cut the cancer out . . . . The avowed purpose of this
bill is to cure this evil, to withdraw the reserve funds
of the country from the congested money centers
and to make them readily available for business uses
in the various sections of the country to which they
belong.125
While NYCHA banks were the important lenders in the
call market, they were not the only lenders.126 As discussed in
Part I (Section B), since the 1900s, out-of-town banks emerged
as direct lenders in the call market.127 They too were drawn
into this market by the great liquidity of call loans (that could
124. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 63-69, at 4 (1913). In the 1907 Panic, the fail-
ure of trust companies was an important aspect of this interplay between
stress on the call loan market and runs by out-of-town banks on their New
York correspondents. See Moen & Tallman, supra note 99.
125. Glass, supra note 107, at 18. The language omitted from the quote
highlights the mechanism of payments suspension. It demonstrates the in-
terweaving of financial stability concerns and credit distribution concerns.
For the Democratic narrative on the sources of political opposition to the
Act, see UNTERMYER, supra note 85, at 5, 7. Untermeyer argued that the op-
position to the bill came not from country banks, but from the New York
banks keeping their bankers’ balances. Id. at 3, 4.
126. MYERS, supra note 44, at 265.
127. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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be called back on demand) as well as by the rate of interest
offered on them.128 The Pujo Committee Report found these
out-of-town balances represented a considerable proportion of
call market lending, some $240 million.129
According to Livingston’s analysis, this out-of-town lend-
ing represented a particular threat to stock exchange stability.
Out-of-town banks could withdraw their loans from brokers
more quickly and erratically than the NYCHA banks that felt a
sense of responsibility for shielding that market.130 Thus, the
need to protect the stock exchange was one of the key motiva-
tions in corporate financiers’ campaigns campaign for a cen-
tral bank. As Livingston demonstrates, those campaigns started
years before the Democrats took up monetary reform after the
1912 election. From the perspective of corporate financiers, a
central bank could act as a lender of last resort when the call
market was in distress. Similarly, in periods where out-of-town
banks glutted the market with funds, the central bank could
raise its interest rate to prevent destabilizing speculation.131
While entirely correct, Livingston’s analysis of the origins
of the Fed nevertheless ignores important differences between
the agendas of corporate financiers and mainstream Demo-
crats. Where corporate financiers viewed the central bank as
128. Recall that the New York banks paid country banks 2% on their bank-
ers’ balances. When the call loan rate went above 2%, country banks thus
had an incentive to shift any excess balances (not required for their
reserves) to higher interest call loans. For further discussion, see MYERS,
supra note 44, at 268.
129. ARSÈNE PAULIN PUJO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PURSU-
ANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRA-
TION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 45
(1913). The estimate relies on partial data and appears to be conservative.
Interestingly, the Pujo Committee Report revealed skepticism that monetary
reform alone would reverse the trend of out-of-town banks lending on call.
For this reason, it recommended an explicit limitation on the proportion of
bank assets invested in call loans. Id. at 158–59. This recommendation was
not included in the Act, but is close in its spirit to later regulations of loans
to brokers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012). For a discussion of the modern
regulatory framework (and the flexibility it allows to brokers), see Nadav
Orian Peer, Broker–Dealers in Monetary Transmission: Mark-to-Market Mismatch
and Margin Netting (work in progress, 2018).
130. See MYERS, supra note 44, at 268–69. See also Moen & Tallman, supra
note 99, at 1.
131. See, e.g., LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at 157–58.
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means to sustain and stabilize the corporate system, Demo-
cratic reformers were using central bank reform as means of
decentralizing credit away from corporations. In the last sec-
tion of this Part, we move to examine how they intended their
design of the Act to achieve this goal.
C. Democrats’ Design for the Federal Reserve Act
Democrats’ plan to shift bankers’ balances away from the
call loan market and into direct lending in banks’ community
of origin had several components. First, dismantling the
pyramiding of reserves and transferring reserves to the Fed.
Second, having the Fed acquire commercial paper with those
new reserves.132 Third, and most importantly, increasing the
willingness of banks to hold commercial paper, knowing they
could rely on this paper to borrow from the Fed as a lender of
last resort. With greater demand for commercial paper, Demo-
crats hoped rates would drop, increasing the supply and re-
ducing the cost of credit to small commercial borrowers. The
following paragraphs take these different design components
in turn.
First, the Act repealed the reserve status of balances kept
with correspondents under the National Bank Act.133 Section
2 of the Act established twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks,
each presiding over its respective district. National banks
within those regions were required to become “members” of
the Federal Reserve Banks if they wished to maintain their na-
tional bank charter.134 Section 19 of the Act then provided
that all member banks—including country banks, Reserve
City, or Central Reserve City banks—could only meet their re-
serve requirements by keeping cash in vault and by maintain-
ing balances with their Federal Reserve Bank. The Senate
132. To clarify, under the Act, commercial paper was not to be the only
asset the nascent Federal Reserve was allowed to hold, but it was to play a
highly substantial role.
133. 12 U.S.C. § 19. The repeal of reserve status for bankers’ balances was
one of the key distinguishing features between the Democratic Federal Re-
serve Act and the Republican 1911 Aldrich Plan for a central bank. See NEL-
SON W. ALDRICH, SUGGESTED PLAN FOR MONETARY LEGISLATION, S. DOC. NO.
784 (3d Sess. 1911). See also SANDERS supra note 34, at 246; Willis, supra note
108, at 19.
134. In other words, national banks wishing to remain out of the Federal
Reserve System had to switch to a state charter.
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Committee Report on the bill estimated the amount of
reserves thus transferred to the Federal Reserve Banks at over
$600 million.135 For reference, this is roughly the size of the
call loan market.136
Like the bankers’ balances kept with NYCHA banks, mem-
ber banks could use their new balances kept with the Federal
Reserve Banks to settle inter-regional payments.137 Thus, the
Federal Reserve Banks came to replace New York as the na-
tion’s inter-regional clearinghouse. And whereas the New York
Banks channeled funds into the call loan market, the provi-
sions of the Act required the Fed to deploy its resources into
very different avenues. This leads to section 13, the center-
piece of the Act and the Fed’s power as a lender of last re-
sort.138 Section 13, authorizes the Fed to “discount”—essen-
tially, to lend against139—the commercial paper of its member
banks:
Upon the indorsement [sic] of any of its member
banks . . . any Federal reserve bank may discount
notes, drafts, and bills of exchange arising out of ac-
tual commercial transactions; that is, notes, drafts,
and bills of exchange issued or drawn for agricul-
tural, industrial, or commercial purposes, or the pro-
ceeds of which have been used, or are to be used, for
such purposes . . . .140
135. S. REP. NO. 63-133, pt. 1, at 10 (1913). With an additional paid-in
capital of $50 million, and government deposits of some $150 million, the
Federal Reserve Banks would have a minimum balance sheet of $800 mil-
lion. For reference, this was almost half the assets of all New York national
banks ($1,762 million). See COMPTROLLER, supra note 101, at 196.
136. See ARSÈNE PAULIN PUJO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PUR-
SUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRA-
TION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593 (1913).
137. As Edward Stevens explains, the Act has also established the Federal
Reserve Banks as local clearinghouses within their respective regions. See Ste-
vens, supra note 85, at 19.
138. In addition to section 13 discounts, the other main authority for Fed
investments was asset purchases through open market operations (Section
14). The framers of the Act, however, considered discounts as far more sig-
nificant than open market operations.
139. From a technical point of view, discounting involves the endorsement
of a negotiable instrument and is legally distinct from secured lending. The
economic essence, however, is virtually identical.
140. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 13, 38 Stat. 263
(1913).
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As discussed in the Introduction, section 13 commercial
paper was of very short term, “not more than ninety days” (an
important exception will be discussed in Part III below). The
limitation of commercial paper to short maturities was part of
a conservative banking doctrine known as “real bills.” Real bills
doctrine was advanced by not only the Democratic framers of
the Act, but also by many contemporary bankers and even cor-
porate financiers.141 This doctrine played a key role in the
complex coalitions and tensions that emerged between the Ur-
ban-Competitive Agenda (represented by the Democratic
framers), the Regional Development Agenda, and the Corpo-
rate Agenda.
The central tenet of the real bills doctrine was to limit
monetary expansion by the banking system, and, most of all,
the central bank. According to that doctrine, monetary expan-
sion should be limited to the humble purpose of providing
short-term working capital as opposed to facilitating fixed capi-
tal investment.142 Thus, the money supply may expand to allow
a retailer to purchase a stock of goods from a wholesaler in
January, so that the retailer can sell the merchandise by April,
and quickly repay the loan. On the other hand, the money
supply should not expand to allow investment in a steel factory
that may take years to repay.143 Such expansion, real bills advo-
cates feared, would be purely speculative and could breed in-
flation and financial instability.
While there was nothing particularly radical about real
bills ideas (in fact, it was a hallmark of banking conservatism),
the Democrats’ Urban-Competitive Agenda imbued this doc-
trine with subversive content. Thus, Democrats made real bills
doctrine a lynchpin of their assault on the call loan market.
141. Modern authors, including Mehrling, supra note 34, and LIVINGSTON,
supra note 27, distinguished corporate financiers’ position from the real bills
doctrine. While their work reveals that corporate financiers’ position was in-
deed distinct in important ways, I believe corporate financiers shared many
of the key principles of the doctrine. Most importantly, they shared the aver-
sion to allowing discounting of longer-term loans—“accommodation pa-
per”—held by country banks. This will be discussed in Part III below.
142. See, e.g., BANKING REFORM 75 (James L. Laughlin ed., 1912).
143. For a modern discussion of the real bills doctrine, see Mehrling,
supra note 34, at 209. For a contemporary description, see Eugene E. Agger,
The Commercial Paper Debate, 22 J. POL. ECON. 661, 668 (1914). For a powerful
contemporary critique of real bills ideas, see H.G. Moulton, Commercial Bank-
ing and Capital Formation II, 26 J. POL. ECON. 638, 638–63 (1918).
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The type of credit required by large corporations was primarily
for fixed investments (like industrial plants) and for mergers
and acquisitions. For this reason, Democrats’ attempt to recon-
struct the monetary system around real bills was at the same
time also an attempt to divorce the monetary system from cor-
porate finance.144 Henry Parker Willis, one of the main draft-
ers of the bill, referred to this split as he explained the philoso-
phy behind the Act. The new Act, he wrote,
[D]eclines to consider the banker as one whose duty
it is to promote enterprises, float issues of securities,
or aid in stock speculation [e.g., by lending through
call loans]. That all these phases of financial effort
have their place—a desirable place when properly
defined and recognized—the act fully concedes, but
it holds in principle that that place is not found in
connection with the work of commercial banks.145
Translated into the language of section 13, corporate in-
vestment in fixed capital did not arise from “actual commer-
cial transactions” and hence, failed to meet the eligibility test
for section 13 discounting by the Fed. To remove any doubt,
the definition of eligible paper explicitly excluded call loans
used to fund corporate securities, and “such definition shall
not include notes, drafts, or bills covering merely investments
or issued or drawn for the purpose of carrying or trading in
stocks, bonds, or other investment securities146 . . . [i.e., call
loans].”147
144. The 1933 Glass–Steagall Act, with its famous separation of commer-
cial and investment banking, was the culmination of this agenda. Banking
Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
145. Willis, supra note 108, at 19.
146. The exception here was notes, drafts, and bills carrying United States
government securities.
147. It is interesting to note that the Republican Aldrich Plan also gener-
ally denied the discounting based on investment securities. NELSON W. AL-
DRICH, SUGGESTED PLAN FOR MONETARY LEGISLATION, S. DOC. NO. 784, at 15
(3d Sess. 1911); but see id. § 40 for emergency authority. However, while the
restrictions appear similar, the significance of the Democratic version for
credit distribution was arguably much greater. The reason is that, as dis-
cussed supra note 133, the Aldrich Plan did not require the transferring of
out-of-town banks’ reserves away from the New York banks to the newly cre-
ated central bank. Thus, the size of discounts by that central bank would
have likely been much smaller.
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In fact, the language of the Act later gave rise to the argu-
ment that section 13 prohibited banks from discounting even
otherwise eligible commercial paper, if they intended to use
the proceeds of the discounts to increase their call loans to
brokers.148
FIGURE 8: SEN. CARTER GLASS (CHAIR, LEFT PANEL) AND
HENRY PARKER WILLIS (EXPERT, RIGHT PANEL) OF THE HOUSE
BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE
This brings us to the third and final component of Demo-
crats’ plan: the broader implications of a lender of last resort
for the commercial paper market. With the Fed standing ready
to lend against commercial paper, Democrats anticipated that
commercial paper would become far more desirable to banks.
Banks would reduce their demand for call loans and increase
their demand for commercial paper. The increased demand,
in turn, would lead to reduced costs for borrowers on commer-
cial paper (i.e., lower commercial paper rates).149 In this way,
Democrats’ design for a lender of last resort was part of their
broader agenda of competition and decentralization. As
Henry Parker Willis explained, “local banks will be able, by
rediscounting the paper of local enterprises, to provide the
funds needed by such enterprises in their operations” and
148. Controversy around this point arose during the Fed’s attempts to
curb the bull market of the late 1920s before the Stock Market Crash of
1929. See A.C. Miller, Responsibility for Federal Reserve Policies: 1927–1929, 25
AM. ECON. REV. 442, 454 (1935).
149. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 108, at 19. See also Banking and Currency
Hearings, supra note 102, at 825–26 (statement of Samuel Untermyer).
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“credit . . . will be cheaper and more evenly diffused, as well as
more steady and more certainly to be counted upon by those
who do business by acceptable methods.”150
Democrats’ analysis of the links between credit availability
and lender-of-last-resort power is consistent with the Constitu-
tional Approach to money, as discussed in Part I. When the law
authorizes a central bank to act as a lender of last resort
against certain assets, it is essentially providing a guarantee
that these assets will be easily convertible into legal tender.
That guarantee is a highly valuable advantage that those assets
would enjoy over assets that are not eligible for Fed support.
In modern terms, this advantage is called a “liquidity pre-
mium.” Because holders of eligible assets value their special
liquidity (their convertibility into legal tender), they would be
willing to hold those assets for even substantially lower interest
rate returns.151 All things equal, standard economic analysis
predicts an increase in the access to credit of borrowers who
can issue eligible assets (i.e., commercial paper borrowers). In
this way, one sees the Constitutional Approaches’ claim that
the definition of the unit of account raises choice between al-
ternatives—namely, which assets will be eligible. These choices
have important distributive stakes: what class of borrowers will
enjoy preferred access to credit?
Thus, to summarize this Part, the Democratic design for
the Act was part of an agenda of replacing corporate concen-
tration with competition and decentralization. The Fed’s
150. Willis, supra note 108, at 20. One other initiative Democrats hopped
to achieve with the Act is the creation of an active secondary market for
“acceptances.” Acceptances are a particular type of commercial paper that
bears the endorsement (essentially, the credit guarantee) of a bank or other
large financial institution. The most important promoter of the acceptance
principle in the U.S. was corporate financier Paul Warburg. See PAUL M.
WARBURG, NAT’L MONETARY COMM’N, THE DISCOUNT SYSTEM IN EUROPE, S.
DOC. NO. 61-402 (1910). I chose to leave out the discussion of acceptances
given the somewhat limited scope in which Democrats incorporated that
project into the Act. National banks were only authorized to accept paper
arising from import and export transactions. This restriction meant that the
acceptance project was largely irrelevant for domestic transactions. See Fed-
eral Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 13, 38 Stat. 263 (1913).
151. See DESAN, supra note 33 (analysis of the “cash premium”). See also
Ricks, supra note 13, at 93–95 for a discussion of empirical work quantifying
the size of the liquidity premium in short-term Treasury bills (this work was
later published as Robin Greenwood et al., A Comparative-Advantage Approach
to Government Debt Maturity, 70 J. FIN. 1683 (Aug. 2015)).
412 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 15:367
lender-of-last-resort powers need to be understood within this
broader context. They were not only attempts at preventing
panics but a program to redistribute credit away from the cor-
porate capital market and into smaller scale commercial activ-
ity. The next part will explore how the Democrats’ agenda in-
teracted with the agrarian economy of the periphery.
III.
THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
The Regional Development Agenda refers to the heritage
of the developing and largely agricultural economy of the
United States throughout the nineteenth century. On the eve
of the Civil War, 53% of the U.S. workforce was employed in
agriculture, towering over 14% in manufacturing and 12% in
trade.152 By 1910, despite rapid urbanization in the interven-
ing half century, agriculture still accounted for 31% of the
workforce, only slightly less than manufacturing (22%) and
trade (14%) combined.153
The position of the agricultural periphery154 towards the
Act reveals a combination of support and even excitement
with a thread of continuous frustration. On the one hand,
agrarian representatives shared the bill’s goal of driving credit
from Wall Street into Main Street155 and overwhelmingly voted
for it in Congress. It is telling, in this respect, that this support
encompassed not only the Democratic party—with its dispro-
portionately large agrarian base—but also agrarian members
of the Republican and Progressive parties.156
152. See Stanley Lebergott, Labor Force and Employment, 1800–1960, in OUT-
PUT, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER 1800, at
118 (Dorothy S. Brady ed., 1966).
153. Id. For reference, the current share of the U.S. workforce employed
in agriculture is 1.5% while the world average is around 29%, roughly the
same as the U.S. economy during the passage of the Act. See Employment in
Agriculture (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?end=2017&start=
1973 (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
154. I use the term “periphery” in the way suggested by SANDERS, supra
note 34, at 16.
155. See e.g., id. at 249, 470 n.99; Banking and Currency Reform: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 62d Cong. 516
(1913) [hereinafter Reform Hearings] (statement of T.J. Brooks).
156. See SANDERS, supra note 34, at 76, 252. Sanders’ data from congres-
sional votes on the Federal Reserve Act shows support was considerably
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While agrarian support was crucial, however, for many
members of the periphery, mainstream Democrats’ limitation
of lender-of-last-resort powers to short-term commercial paper
proved to be a lasting source of frustration.157 The Regional
Development Agenda sought to harness the monetary system
to provide flexible and long-term credit. This agenda proved
to be at odds with mainstream Democrats’ commitment to the
real bills doctrine and its ideal of short-term mercantile activ-
ity.
This Part begins by exploring the clash between main-
stream Democrats’ real bills ideals and the Regional Develop-
ment Agenda (Section A). It then documents the repeated
agrarian complaints of discrimination against country bank
“accommodation paper” in the Act’s provision for lender-of-
last-resort support (Section B). Finally, this Part demonstrates
the complex negotiation between mainstream Democrats and
agrarians over the final language of the Act (Section C). This
negotiation provides another example of how concerns with
credit distribution determined the scope and nature of lender-
of-last-resort power.
A. The Clash Between the European Ideal and Local Needs
By the 1912 elections, the “silver debates” of the 1890s
had all but faded. The Gold Standard Act of 1900 codified the
dollar unit of account as 25 8/10 grains of gold (nine-tenths
fine). All other forms of money—greenbacks, national bank
notes, and the largest portion of the money supply, bank de-
posits—were ultimately convertible into gold coin in one way
or another.158 That the United States would remain on the in-
ternational gold standard was a political reality that virtually
no participant in the debates over the Act (including Bryan
higher for “periphery” as opposed to “core” and “diverse” regions (in the
House, 86% support by periphery as opposed to 67% support in core, and in
the Senate 76% to 47% percent respectively). Id. For Republican and Pro-
gressive agrarian support, see id. at 251.
157. To be sure, the circumstances of agricultural communities across the
country varied widely. In some communities, the Act’s provision for ninety-
day paper raised no problems. My goal here is to articulate a set of concerns
that resonated with a substantial group within the countryside, rather than
to suggest these concerns were shared by all agrarians.
158. See Gold Standard Act, ch. 41, §§ 1–2, 31 Stat. 45 (1900).
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himself) sought to undermine.159 But where the gold defini-
tion of the dollar now seemed indisputable, the broader ethos
and institutions of the gold standard were still up for grabs.160
This is particularly the case with the definition of section 13
eligible paper that the Fed could discount as lender of last re-
sort.
For Democrats, the decision to design the Act around
short-term commercial paper served two essential goals. On
the one hand, as discussed in Part II, commercial paper
grounded in “actual commercial transactions” suited Demo-
crats’ anti-corporate politics and their assault on the call loan
market. At the same time, advancing the market for commer-
cial paper to these Democrats was part of a program to estab-
lish the kind of institutions that prevailed in the core countries
of the international gold standard: England, Germany, and
France. Here, ironically, Democrats were very much in line
with the aspirations of the corporate financiers whom they so
severely criticized.
Under the international gold standard, countries under-
took to maintain price parity between their domestic unit of
account (e.g., the British pound) and a given quantity of gold.
In the core gold standard countries, central banks relied on
highly liquid markets in commercial paper to defend the gold
parity of their unit of account. In brief, by raising their interest
rates (tightening monetary policy) central banks could bring
about an increase in the rate paid on commercial paper.
Higher rates tended to draw international investors to
purchase that commercial paper, thus propping up the domes-
tic currency in the foreign exchange markets.161 In the United
States, absent a central bank and a liquid commercial paper
159. An outlier case is Rep. Charles August Lindbergh. See C.A.
Lindbergh, Minority Views on the Glass Bill, in HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY
COMMITTEE REPORT, H.R. 7837, 63d Cong. 156 (1913). Ironically, less than
one year after the passage of the Act the international gold standard was
suspended due to eruption of World War I. The United States remained
virtually the only major economy on gold.
160. In this sense, the debate over the Federal Reserve Act provides an
example for what Duncan Kennedy called “nesting”: “the reproduction,
within a doctrinal solution to a problem, of the policy conflict the solution
was supposed to settle.” Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 97 (1991).
161. See, e.g., Reform Hearings, supra note 155, at 76–77 (statement of Paul
M. Warburg); WARBURG, supra note 150, at 17.
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market, adjustments to defend gold parity were far less smooth
and, oftentimes, chaotic.162
On the eve of reform, corporate financiers and main-
stream Democrats—despite their deep political disagree-
ments—were united in their desire to follow the European
precedent and establish a liquid market in commercial paper
in the United States.163 The Fed’s standing as a lender of last
resort against short-term commercial paper was crucial in pro-
viding support and stability to that commercial paper market.
As it turns out, however, the European inspired short-term
commercial paper market went against the grain of a long-
standing local tradition in the United States.
In a young and capital starved economy like the nine-
teenth century United States, commercial paper had simply
never played the role it had under the more mature European
economies. In her seminal work The New York Money Market,
Margaret Myers reflected on the significance of this theme in
the early days of U.S. banking:
[A]lthough the early banks of the United States were
modeled upon those of Great Britain as to the char-
ter provisions, it was impossible for them to adopt the
rule laid down in England for the safe conduct of
banks, which would confine the loans and discounts
to self-liquidating paper based on exchange of goods
[i.e., real bills]. The place of trade in the economy of
Great Britain was far more important than in
America; in this country there was a very large de-
mand for long-term credit for the development of
new lands and new industries, and a comparatively
small demand for short-term credit with which to fi-
nance the exchange of products.164
As Myers’ work demonstrates, the focus on long-term
credit was in itself part of a broader understanding of the
place of banking within the community. In the early nine-
teenth century, U.S. public opinion considered a banking
charter as a “valuable monopolistic privilege” granted to the
bank by the polity. In return for that privilege, communities
expected their banks to lend within the community, and to
162. See, e.g., WARBURG, supra note 150, at 21–22.
163. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 108, at 20.
164. MYERS, supra note 44, at 44.
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lend on a long-term basis.165 Later reformers loosened proce-
dures to receive bank charters,166 but the nexus between bank-
ing and the capital development of the community survived.
The 1864 National Bank Act arguably reflected this ethos in its
restriction of branch banking.167 Restrictions on branch bank-
ing resulted in a radically decentralized banking system, with
over seven thousand national banks, most of which were oper-
ating with small capital on a local scale.168 Such banks were
naturally subject to considerable pressures in meeting the
credit needs of their communities.169
As the century drew to a close, demands for flexible and
long-term credit also became part of the turbulent silver de-
bates of the 1890s. Parallel to their campaign for the re-mone-
tization of silver, Populists advocated plans to use their crops
as collateral for low-cost borrowing from the government.
Their proposal, known as the “Sub-Treasury Plan” could be
understood as an early Populist vision for section 13 of the Act.
Crucially, the Sub-Treasury Plan provided farmers a full year to
sell their crops before loans had to be redeemed.170 This is a
165. Id. at 45–46.
166. Id. at 85. For a discussion of the significance of the history of bank
charters for corporate law theory, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T.
Omarova, “Special,” Vestigal, or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About
the Corporation — and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 453 (2016).
167. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, §§ 6(2), 8, 38 Stat.
251 (1913). Another aspect of the National Bank Act—its restrictions on
mortgage lending—was deeply problematic from the point of view of com-
munity development. See id. § 28. The restriction, however, was partially
evaded. See, e.g., Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 1539–65
(testimony of H.A. Moehlenpah). Section 24 of the Federal Reserve Act par-
tially loosened these restrictions as part of the broader compromise with
agrarians. See infra note 195.
168. See COMPTROLLER, supra note 101, at 12. Out of a total of paid in
capital of about $1,046 million for all national banks, some 60% of banks
had paid in capital of less than $1 million. Around 40% had capital less than
$250,000.
169. In distinction, the modern U.S. commercial banking sector is domi-
nated by large holding companies operating on a national scope. Under the
current system, banks’ obligations to their communities regulated by the
1977 Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”). See Community Reinvestment
Act § 802, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2012).
170. See Report of the Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, in A
POPULIST READER: SELECTIONS FROM THE WORKS OF AMERICAN POPULIST LEAD-
ERS (George Brown Tindall ed., 1889) (Charles Macune is believed to be the
author of the document).
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far longer period than the short-term commercial paper envi-
sioned by mainstream Democrat. The stakes of the difference
in duration are high. The shorter the duration, the faster
farmers had to repay their loans after the harvest. Marketing
their crops with haste often forced farmers to sell at depressed
prices. In a second and even more ambitious plan—the “Land
Loan System”—Populists proposed the Treasury would lend
against fifty-year mortgages.171
Figure 9 presents a cartoon satirizing the Farmers’ Alli-
ance demands for government credit. The cartoon presents a
farmer approaching Uncle Sam’s pawn shop, mortgage deed
in hand. The sign next to the pawn shop reads: “Your Uncle
Sam will advance money on crops and make loans to farmers
without interest . . . . All the greenbacks you wish. Two percent
mortgages on your farms.”
FIGURE 9: “THE NEW UNCLE SAM: HOW THE FARMERS’
ALLIANCE PROPOSE TO HAVE THE GOVERNMENT RUN
WHEN THEY GET THE POWER” (1891)
Bernhard Gillam, The New Uncle Sam: How the Farmers’ Alliance Propose to Have the Gov-
ernment Run When They Get the Power, JUDGE MAG. (Jan. 17, 1891), https://www.loc.gov/
item/97504631/.
And so, the creation of a lender of last resort raised not
only the question of corporate power that divided Democrats
and corporate financiers. It also raised a question about the
legitimacy and relative importance of peripheral credit as a
171. See id. at 175.
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model of development. This tension between the Urban-Com-
petitive and Regional Development Agendas became a central
theme in the congressional hearings over the Act.
B. The Debate over “Accommodation Paper”
The congressional hearings about the Fed contained re-
peated agrarian complaints that section 13’s definition of eligi-
ble paper was discriminatory against the periphery. In many
regions, country bank loans were far more flexible in the dura-
tion of time they offered the borrower to repay. Farmers typi-
cally borrowed as early as spring and could not repay their
loans until selling their crops towards the end of the year. As
one witness before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency explained, “the country banker’s paper is seasonal
paper. It would be utter folly to take from the ordinary farmer,
or the merchant who is dependent upon the farmer in the
country, a piece of paper maturing at any other time than in
the fall of the year.”172
Another witness, a manufacturer of farm equipment in
the grain economy of Minneapolis complained that if eligible
paper were limited to ninety days, “[y]ou might just as well say
to us, ‘Get off the earth.’ We cannot give the bank in Minneap-
olis or any other place our paper, which they can in turn take
to regional [Federal Reserve] bank and get it rediscounted,
simply because we cannot borrow under six months at a
time.”173 His testimony then accused the bill of geographical
discrimination. The bill, he argued, suited the needs of re-
gions with short production cycles, like metropolitan New
York. The Act, however, was ill suited for the grain economy of
the Northeast, where the production and distribution cycle
was considerably longer.174
172. Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 946 (testimony of
Edward B. Wells).
173. Id. at 968 (testimony of F.E. Kenaston). It is important to note that
the provision for ninety-day paper referred to the maturity of the paper “at
the time of discount,” rather than the time of its making. The Senate com-
mittee amended the bill to make this point explicit. See H.R. 7837, 63d Cong.
§§ 13–14 (1913). Some agrarians found this adjustment sufficient; many
others did not.
174. Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 968 (testimony of
F.E. Kenaston).
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In addition to their longer maturities, loans in the coun-
try—often dubbed “accommodation paper”—were made with
the tacit understanding of repeated renewal. Country bankers
did not insist on timely repayment of the loans, but realized
they will have to extend the loans if the need arose for the
borrower: a bad crop, low prices, sickness in the family, roads
in disrepair.175 One witness, a correspondent banker from St.
Louis described the methods of his country bank customers
and argued they will not be able to discount their loans with
the Fed:
If the crop is not good, [the loan] runs until the next
crop comes in . . . it is renewed and renewed again.
The loans of a country bank are never cleaned up
[i.e., repaid, as opposed to extended] like those of a
city bank or like those of a reserve city
bank . . . . Therefore, in dealing with that subject
[i.e., Fed discounting for banks] you must perforce
be dealing with the institutions that are in the larger
centers relatively.176
Another witness from Minnesota—a wholesale grocer—
insisted country banks were loath to demand clients to meet
maturing bills at inconvenient times, as this risked losing their
business.177 A country banker from Hattiesburg, Mississippi de-
scribed repeatedly extending a four-month loan to a firm for
no less than fourteen years.178 An outlier case perhaps, but it
nevertheless demonstrates the ways in which country bankers
were pushing the boundaries of short-term “working capital”
and—through renewals—extending to their clients what was
essentially longer-term fixed capital.
Such flexible renewals were anathema to adherents of the
real bills doctrine, for whom safety in bank credit expansion
required the discipline of prompt repayment by borrowers.
Just so, Henry Parker Willis’ advice to bankers briefly after the
passage of the Act was essentially to stop lending on accommo-
175. For some of these factors, see id. at 973–74.
176. Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 128–29 (testimony
of Festus J. Wade). The witness, Festus J. Wade, was President of the Mercan-
tile Trust Co. in St. Louis, Missouri—apparently, a city bank offering corre-
spondent services to country banks. Id. at 125.
177. Id. at 1079.
178. Id. at 1525.
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dation paper. The banker, said Willis, ought to “bring his
methods of borrowing and his view of commercial paper into
harmony with European practice, to accustom himself to
adopt prompt payment of notes and bills without extended re-
newals, and to putting his business on short-term cash ba-
sis.”179
From the perspective of the agricultural periphery, state-
ments like Willis’ surely carried overtones of condescension
and aggression. They contributed to a sense that corporate fin-
anciers and urban merchants were joining forces against the
periphery. As one witness before the House Committee com-
plained, “[in] the United States finance and commerce have
locked shields in a common cause and have prospered amaz-
ingly. Agriculture and urban labor each stand aloof and are
fighting a losing battle.”180 Finance and commerce secured
their prosperity through a financial architecture that better
served their credit needs. Thus, the witness continued,
“[c]ommerce has a dynamic dollar and agriculture a static dol-
lar. Commerce has a liquid credit and agriculture a vicious
credit. Commerce can mobilize its capital credit and agricul-
ture cannot. Agriculture needs a system that will vitalize its re-
sources, mobilize it capital, liquefy its assets, and render dy-
namic its collateral.”181
In the next section, we move to see how the tension be-
tween these different agendas channeled into debates over the
definition of section 13 eligible paper.
C. Negotiating Section 13 Eligible Paper
The tension between mainstream Democrats and agrarian
complaints resulted in repeated changes to the language of
section 13. The overall result of these changes reflected a com-
promise: it stretched mainstream Democrats’ real bills ideals
in some respects, but also left unsatisfied some agrarian
claims.182 In the context of this Article, these repeated
179. Willis, supra note 108, at 23–24.
180. Reform Hearings, supra note 155, at 504 (statement of T.J. Brooks).
181. Id.
182. My argument in this section builds on excellent work by SANDERS,
supra note 34, at 217–66, as well as original primary source research. Sanders
critiques Livingston’s conclusion that attributes the Act primarily to the ef-
forts of corporate financiers. Instead, she proposes that the Fed was a com-
promise between capitalists, state officials, and farmers. Id. at 257. My own
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changes demonstrate a real-life debate over credit distribution
at work. They show us that the lender-of-last-resort power is
not merely an issue of financial stability, but a constitutional
(small c) decision over the relative access of different groups
to credit.
When Rep. Carter Glass initially introduced the bill, the
definition of commercial paper was made for just 45 days, far
too short to meet agricultural demands.183 Discomfort with
this provision was one of the main grievances in a Democratic
agrarian rebellion that took place at the House Committee on
Banking and Currency. In the midst of this rebellion, Rep.
Robert Lee Henry of Texas introduced an amendment to ex-
tend the maturity for commercial paper to 120 days. Henry
also proposed a “modern version of the old populist sub-
treasury plan”: lending based on Warehouse receipts, state and
local government bonds to the tune of $700 million (for refer-
ence, recall this was, again, roughly the size of the call loan
market).184 As historian Elizabeth Sanders describes, the
Henry rebellion “was ended only after a long and unruly Dem-
ocratic caucus.”185 The rebels managed to double the maturity
of eligible paper, from 45 to 90 days.186 They also negotiated
other concessions on banking matters that concerned the pe-
riphery, including a pledge from President Wilson to support
emphasis in this section is more specifically with the tension between farm-
ers and mainstream Democrats on the question of what type of credit should
be eligible for lender-of-last-resort support.
183. See id. at 250. The 1911 Republican Aldrich Plan allowed for dis-
counting of paper with maturity of only 28 days. NELSON W. ALDRICH, SUG-
GESTED PLAN FOR MONETARY LEGISLATION, S. DOC. NO. 784, at 12 (3d Sess.
1911). Other provisions in the bill allowed for discounting of longer-dated
paper (four months), but they required further procedures—the willingness
of a local association of banks to guarantee the paper—and the payment of
an additional commission for that guarantee. It is difficult to estimate how
these conditions would have allowed for discounting of paper longer than 28
days.
184. See SANDERS, supra note 34, at 250.
185. Id.
186. The language of the House bill also included authority for discount-
ing of 120-day paper, but subjected this authority to restrictions concerning
the Fed’s reserve ratio and the proportion of 120-day paper discounted by
the borrowing member bank. See H.R. 7837, 63d Cong. §§ 13–14 (1913).
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a standalone measure for long-term agricultural credit.187 The
House Democratic caucus made the compromise binding.
As it happened, however, the controversy soon reemerged
in a second revolt, this time at the Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Committee. Three Democratic members of the Commit-
tee—Senators James Reed, James O’Gorman, and Gilbert
Hitchcock—joined Republicans to oppose the bill. Unlike the
first revolt, which was purely agrarian, the second rebellion
brought together a complex coalition of radical agrarians like
Reed (D, Missouri) and Bristow (R, Kansas), with the conserva-
tive and Bryan opponent Hitchcock (D, Nebraska) leading the
group.188 The second rebellion involved numerous controver-
sies surrounding the Fed’s design that need not concern us
here. Its key significance for our purpose, however, is the way
that revolt ultimately broadened the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort
powers.
As Sanders explains, the competition between the two
camps at the Senate “brought important benefits to the agra-
rian regions.”189 An ultimate deadlock (6:6) meant that the
Committee reported two amendments in disagreement: the
Hitchcock amendment, which sought to replace various provi-
sions of the Act, and the Owen amendment, endorsed by the
administration.190
The Hitchcock amendment doubled the maturity of eligi-
ble paper from three to six months. In explaining the change,
it alluded to all the witnesses who came before the committee
187. That stand-alone measure became the Federal Farm Loan Act of
1916. See SANDERS, supra note 34, at 259–61. The rebels had several other
valuable achievements. See id. at 250.
188. See id. at 252–53, 470 n.190; Dunne, supra note 34.
189. SANDERS, supra note 34, at 254. One of the other main achievements
Sanders mentions here is relaxation of restrictions on national bank lending
on farm land from one year (in the Glass bill) to five years. It is important to
note, however, that this lending authority was restricted to only one third of
the land’s value and 25% of the bank’s capital or one third of its time depos-
its (deposits with a maturity greater than thirty days). See Federal Reserve
Act, supra note 15, §§ 19, 24; H.R. 7837, 63d Cong. §§ 20, 26 (1913).
190. See S. REP. NO. 63-133, pt. 1, at 2. Sen. Reed and O’Gorman were
ultimately converted to the Owen camp. Dunne, supra note 34, at 23. In fact,
some attribute the puzzling fact that Missouri received two regional Federal
Reserve banks (St. Louis and Kansas City) to Reed’s last-moment conversion.
See David C. Wheelock, Economics and Politics in Selecting Federal Reserve Cities:
Why Missouri Has Two Reserve Banks, 97 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 269,
275 (2015).
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and voiced their complaints of geographic discrimination.
“Thousands of banks in the West and in the South,” the
amendment explained, “necessarily take six months’ paper be-
cause of the longer time required for agricultural processes
than for the manufacturing and mercantile processes of the
East.”191 That said, side by side with this nod to agrarians, the
fine print of the Hitchcock amendment also placed significant
constraints on the amount of six-month paper eligible for dis-
count.192 These constraints likely reflected the unstable coali-
tion between agrarians and conservatives within the Hitchcock
camp itself.
FIGURE 10: SEN. OWEN (LEFT PANEL) AND SEN. HITCHCOCK
(RIGHT PANEL)
The Life of Robert L. Owen, Jr.: A Chronology, OKLA. HISTORY CTR., http://
www.okhistory.org/historycenter/federalreserve/owentl.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2018) (right panel); THE WORLD’S WORK 642 (Doubleday, Page &
Company 1922) (left panel).
The Senate ultimately rejected the Hitchcock amend-
ment, but its extension of the duration of commercial paper
191. H.R. 7837, 63d Cong. § 2.
192. The Hitchcock amendment on this point reads: “Notes and bills ad-
mitted to discount under the terms of this paragraph must have a maturity at
the time of discount of not more than one hundred and eighty days: Pro-
vided, however, That not more than fifty per cent of the paper discounted
for any member bank shall have a maturity exceeding ninety days and in no
case shall any member bank have more than $200,000 of rediscounts baring
a maturity longer than ninety days.” Id. at 15.
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was nevertheless influential. Floor amendments to the admin-
istration-sponsored Owen amendment incorporated the mea-
sure to extend the duration of eligible paper. The new lan-
guage authorized the regional Federal Reserve Banks to dis-
count six-month paper “drawn or issued for agricultural
purposes or based on livestock.”193 If that language had stood
alone, it would have represented a considerable achievement
for the agrarian camp. Moderating that achievement some-
what was, again, further language limiting the amount of six-
month paper to be discounted by the regional Federal Reserve
Banks. This time, authority to determine the limitations was
granted to the Federal Reserve Board in Washington.194
The tension between mainstream Democrats and agrarian
interests was present throughout the conference report. One
of the tasks of the conference committee included reconciling
the three-month commercial paper of the House bill with the
six-month provision of the Senate amendment. As conferee
for the House, Carter Glass followed the instructions to accept
the Senate amendment, but only begrudgingly. His grudges
again reveal how different the mainstream Democrat position
was from the agrarian agenda. “In the judgment of some of
us,” complained Glass, “the difference [between three and six
month discounts] is more apparent than real, and certainly
more political than economic.”195 In fact, Glass’ remarks hint
his belief that the Federal Reserve would effectively limit the
regional Federal Reserve Banks’ authority to discount the
longer paper:
I wish to say that while the House conferees would
have, in any event, implicitly followed the instruction
of the House, we did so the more readily in this case
from the conviction that sound banking instinct and
universal banking experience will take care of the sit-
uation presented by this change in the house bill. In
short, we are perfectly confident that those to whom
shall be confided the power and responsibility of ad-
193. H.R. 7837, 63d Cong. § 14.
194. See id. Sanders’ account does not mention those limitations on the
discount of longer-term paper, either in the Hitchcock amendment or the
Conference Report. SANDERS, supra note 34, at 254, 256.
195. Hon. Carter Glass, Speech in the House of Representatives (Dec. 22,
1913).
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ministering this new banking and currency system
will have the wisdom and courage to maintain it in
the most efficient state possible.196
And so, after the House bill, the Henry amendment, the
House caucus compromise, the Hitchcock amendment, the
Senate floor amendment and the Conference Report, the long
standing clash between mainstream Democrats and the agra-
rian periphery finally came to a rest.197 At every turn of this
legislative saga, actors were not only debating lending of last
resort merely from the perspective of financial stability. In-
stead, the definition of lender-of-last-resort powers became the
ground for a broader debate about credit distribution and




The Corporate Agenda was the result of an accelerated
transformation the U.S. economy had been undergoing in the
decades preceding the Act. As late as the 1880s, U.S. industrial
firms in the sectors of manufacturing, distribution, extraction,
and processing were predominantly small and local affairs.198
The very largest of these firms had a capitalization of $5–10
million, a trifle when compared to $100 million by the large
railroads. What is more, unlike the railroads, which had been
raising capital in the securities markets for decades,199 indus-
trial firms were “closely held.” They were owned and managed
by a small number of partners, and used banks for their fi-
nancing. Only two decades later, giant industrial trusts were
coming of age. U.S. Steel held a market share of two thirds of
196. Id.
197. A decade later, Congress further amended the Fed’s authority to in-
clude discounting of nine-month paper. 12 U.S.C. § 348 (2012) (as added
March 4, 1923, ch. 252, title IV, § 404, 42 Stat. 1479).
198. This paragraph draws on Thomas R. Navin & Marion V. Sears, The
Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887–1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105
(1955). For the four categories of business activities that Navin and Sears
define as “industrial,” see id. at 108.
199. See MYERS, supra note 44, at 32–37.
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steel in the United States and soon became the first corpora-
tion with a billion dollar capitalization.200
The corporate financiers who served these new corpora-
tions were also key protagonists in the campaign for a central
bank. Men like Frank Vanderlip of City National Bank and
Paul Warburg of Kuhn Loeb & Co. began campaigning for re-
form years before the 1912 elections that brought Wilson to
power. They remained important interlocutors throughout
the legislative process, testifying in Congress and correspond-
ing with Democratic leaders.201 In regard to the definition of
eligible paper, the position of these corporate financiers
presents an apparent paradox, and one that remains under-
appreciated and unresolved in the historical literature.
On the one hand, corporate financiers were, by their very
nature, creatures of the securities market where corporations
raise capital. The call loan market was a pillar of the securities
market.202 One would therefore expect corporate financiers to
bitterly resist Democrats’ assault on the call loan market
through denial of lender-of-last-resort support to those loans
and the revocation of reserve status to bankers’ balances.203
Not so. Against this expectation, corporate financiers took a
position that was very much consistent with mainstream Demo-
crats’ design. They too exalted the virtues of short-term com-
200. U.S. Steel’s capitalization at that time was $1.4 billion. See United States
Steel Corp., ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/
topic/United-States-Steel-Corporation.
201. For details on Vanderlip and Warburg’s efforts as part of the reform
movement, see LIVINGSTON, supra note 27. See also Paul M. Warburg, Ameri-
can and European Banking Methods and Bank Legislation Compared, in
THE CURRENCY PROBLEM AND THE PRESENT FINANCIAL SITUATION: A SERIES OF
ADDRESSES DELIVERED AT COLUMBIA UNIV., 1907–1908, at 119–51 (Edwin R.A.
Seligman ed., 1908); Frank A. Vanderlip, The Modern Bank, in THE CUR-
RENCY PROBLEM AND THE PRESENT FINANCIAL SITUATION: A SERIES OF AD-
DRESSES DELIVERED AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 1907–1908, at 1–18 (Edwin R.A.
Selignman ed., 1908); Reform Hearings, supra note 155, at 60–85 (statement
of Paul M. Warburg); Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at
1933–2037, 2052–69, 2911–67 (statement of Frank A. Vanderlip). To be
clear, Warburg and Vanderlip each had important disagreements with Dem-
ocrats on other aspects of their plan but were highly supportive of the initia-
tive to create a lender of last resort.
202. See infra Section IV.B. See also O’SULLIVAN, supra note 34, at 59–60;
STEVEN H. JAFFE & JESSICA LAUTIN, CAPITAL OF CAPITAL: MONEY, BANKING, AND
POWER IN NEW YORK CITY 1785–2012, at 96 (2014).
203. See supra Sections II.B–C.
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mercial paper and insisted no other paper shall be included in
section 13. They too opposed the pyramiding of reserves, and
looked forward to replacing call loans with commercial paper
as their main liquid asset.
This puzzling coalition between corporate financiers and
mainstream Democrats has made it more difficult to appreci-
ate the underlying debate around credit distribution that was
so integral to the Act. To reconstruct this dimension of the
debate, this Part begins by more fully describing corporate fin-
anciers’ agenda for a post-competitive and cooperative society
(Section A). It then demonstrates the centrality of the call
loan market to the corporate agenda (Section B) and sheds
some light on the puzzling coalition between corporate finan-
ciers and mainstream Democrats (Section C). Finally, an Epi-
logue to this Part offers a brief reflection on the failure of
agrarians and corporate financiers’ to collaborate and develop
an alternative to mainstream Democrats’ design.
A. Life After Competition
While mainstream Democrats like Brandeis lamented the
decline of competition, to corporate financiers the rise of the
giant industrial corporations was hardly a fall from grace. Con-
centration in industry—“cooperation,” as they preferred to
call it—reflected the needs of a maturing industrial economy
and the technological leaps in energy, transportation and
communications. Electric power, the transcontinental rail, the
transatlantic steamship, the telegraph, the telephone: all of
these technologies required enormous outlays of long-term
capital. These outlays of fixed capital, argued the corporate
financiers, were simply inconsistent with decentralized pricing.
Waves of bankruptcies due to “ruinous competition” between
smaller industrial firms lent force to their reasoning.204
To corporate financiers, the Brandeisian plea to return to
competition, therefore, seemed nostalgic at best and irrespon-
sibly dangerous at worst. The real challenges of the day, they
believed, were about adjusting to the new corporate society.
The adjustments necessary were political, legal, cultural, and
even psychological. The smaller businessmen who were still ad-
vocating the old doctrines of free competition and laissez-faire
were out-of-touch with the conditions of industrial society. In-
204. See supra Section II.A; see also Minsky, supra note 55.
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deed, they were so desperately out-of-touch that clinging to
those doctrines would only breed social dislocation and fo-
ment. The imperative of adjusting to the new corporate soci-
ety, argued the corporate financiers, meant finding a third way
between the anachronism of competition and the specter of
Socialist revolution.205
Consider, for example, the case of labor relations. As his-
torian James Weinstein argued, corporate financiers’ position
towards trade unions was considerably more flexible than the
hard “open shop” (anti-union) line led by small and medium
sized business leaders. The National Civic Federation (“NCF”)
sponsored by corporate financiers was willing to embrace la-
bor unions so long as unions acted conservatively. They hoped
these unions could develop into intermediaries that would sta-
bilize the relationship between labor and capital.206
Corporate financiers also acknowledged that the new con-
ditions of dispersed corporate ownership, with passive share-
holders and professional managers, meant a far greater role
for government in corporate affairs. One notable exponent of
these views was George Perkins, a partner at J.P. Morgan & Co.
Perkins’ views are notable for his later leadership role in
Roosevelt’s 1912 presidential campaign. A few years earlier,
Perkins addressed a crowd at Columbia University as part of a
lecture series on “The Currency Problem and Present Finan-
cial Situation” following the 1907 panic.207 His lecture, The
Modern Corporation, is an excellent example of the way corpo-
rate financiers were creating a new political theory. Some of
the tenets of this theory might seem strangely illiberal; many
others have become mainstays of economic regulation.
205. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 9, 11, and ch. 1 generally.
206. See id. at 13.
207. George W. Perkins, The Modern Corporation, in THE CURRENCY PROB-
LEM AND THE PRESENT FINANCIAL SITUATION: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES DELIV-
ERED AT COLUMBIA UNIV. 1907–1908, at 154–70 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed.,
1908).
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FIGURE 11: GEORGE PERKINS: PARTNER AT J.P. MORGAN & CO.
AND LATER EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY
Picture taken from Prints & Photographs Online Catalog, LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/cph.3b10274/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2018).
Perkins acknowledged that with 100,000 shareholders,
U.S. Steel and other giant corporations “became not only vast
business enterprises, but great and growing institutions for sav-
ings.”208 Anticipating securities regulation by twenty-five years,
he called for a governmental authority to ensure the affairs of
these corporations were “ably and honestly conducted.”209 Per-
kins also called to harness experienced former businessmen to
create a new form of “expert” and “rational” government su-
pervision.210 He analogized these new public servants to jus-
tices on the Supreme Court, arguing they would be able to
“solve most of our difficult problems and be of the greatest
possible benefit and protection to one and all.”211 In raising
such proposals, Perkins’ vision for social adjustment was
208. Id. at 164. Perkins, it is worth noting, was one of the organizers of
U.S. Steel. See e.g., JOHN GARRATY, RIGHT-HAND MAN: THE LIFE OF GEORGE W.
PERKINS 86, 93 (1960).
209. Perkins, supra note 207, at 165.
210. Id. at 166.
211. Id.
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straightforward. If the enormous benefits of corporate society
were to be maintained, the evils had to be contained through
public authority. This compromise would become the key mes-
sage of the 1912 Progressive campaign.
Greater public regulation of private activity was just one
aspect of Perkins’ vision for adjustment to life after competi-
tion. Equally important was the melding of the private and
public spheres themselves and the anticipation of what we to-
day would call corporate social responsibility. The giant corpo-
rations, said Perkins, had become “semi-public” and their
managers “semi-public servants.”212 Corporate responsibilities
thus extended “not only to their stockholders, but to the pub-
lic as well.”213 In Perkins’ view, the separation of ownership
from control—which many feared was the fatal flaw of the cor-
poration—was actually an important benefit. Unlike small bus-
iness owners, said Perkins, the ownership share of corporate
managers was “infinitesimal” compared to the size of the cor-
poration.214 Their small private stake made managers free to
disregard their self-interest, adopting instead the position of
“the impartial judge, the intelligent, well-posted and fair arbi-
trator.”215
The new semi-public role of corporations was most easily
evident in the rapid expansion of welfare programs that took
place in the decade preceding the Act. As historian James
Weinstein noted, corporations were taking on the responsibili-
ties of providing for their workers a long list of services, many
of which we would today regard as basic governmental func-
tions (or Google-style benefits). The long list of welfare pro-
grams included “continued technical education for workers,
kindergarten for their children, low-cost housing, recreational
facilities and some aspects of public health programs, saving
and lending money, insurance, pensions.”216
Corporations, to summarize, were in the process of be-
coming little polities.217 The rise of these corporations—and




216. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 19–21.
217. Equally true, in the eyes of corporate financiers, government itself
increasingly resembled a vast “trust.” See, e.g., Robert H. Wiebe, The House of
Morgan and the Executive, 1905–1913, 65 AM. HIST. REV. 49–50 (Oct. 1959).
2019] NEGOTIATING THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 431
their continued flourishing—depended on the institution of
the stock exchange. As another speaker at the 1908 Columbia
lecture series explained, the corporate system was only made
possible “by enlisting the active interest of the multitude, and
for this a wide and free market [in securities] is an indispensa-
ble piece of machinery.”218 That indispensable piece of ma-
chinery was the NYSE, where both stocks and bonds were
listed at the time.
By 1913, the NYSE listed securities with a par value of $26
billion, around three times the size of all demand deposits in
the U.S. commercial banking system.219 With $800 million or
so, the call loan market—where bankers made overnight loans
to the NYSE brokers—represented only a small fraction of out-
standing securities. But the relatively small size of the market
does not reflect its enormous significance. The call loan mar-
ket was the beating heart of the stock exchange and integral to
its day-to-day working. In the next section, we explore the role
of the call loan market as an engine of corporate finance.
B. The Call Loan Market as an Engine of Corporate Finance
The call loan market was indispensable to corporate fin-
anciers for two interrelated reasons. The first reason was al-
ready discussed in the context of Democrats’ assault on the
call loan market. It concerns the exceptionally low average
rates that NYSE brokers and their speculative customers en-
joyed when borrowing through call loans.220
To recap our discussion in Part I, banks were willing to
lend on call for exceptionally low rates because of the special
liquidity that call loans offered them. On average, the interest
rates on these loans was some 160 basis points (1.60%) below
even the most highly rated commercial paper. The next step is
218. Thomas F. Woodlock, The Stock Exchange and the Money Market, in THE
CURRENCY PROBLEM AND THE PRESENT FINANCIAL SITUATION: A SERIES OF AD-
DRESSES DELIVERED AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 1907–1908, at 23–24 (Edwin
R.A. Seligman ed., 1908).
219. R.C. MICHIE, THE LONDON AND NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGES
1850–1914, at 168 (Routledge Revivals 2012); see also supra Part I.
220. Customers could not generally borrow directly in the call market, but
borrowed through their brokers. See Orian Peer, supra note 7. The role of
these early brokers was thus analogous to the role of modern broker–dealers
in the repo market. Broker–dealers borrow in the tri-party repo market and
lend to their hedge fund customers. Id.
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to understand how these low interest rates on call loans cre-
ated an incentive for speculators to leverage up their capital,
and purchase a much larger amount of securities than they
would have under regular interest rates. The speculators, in
fact, were engaging in maturity transformation, analogously to
commercial banks.221
Consider a highly stylized example where a speculator on
the NYSE purchases $100 of securities with an expected return
of 4.25%. To fund the trade, the speculator will use a small
amount of its own capital, say, $20.222 The remaining $80 the
speculator will borrow through a call loan at 3%. A speculator
pursuing this strategy is pocketing the spread between low
rates on overnight borrowing (3%) and higher rates on
longer-term lending (4.25%). In our example, this strategy has
a lucrative expected return of 9.25%.223 Note that this is nearly
double the return that speculator would have made without
borrowing on call (i.e. if she had limited her securities
purchases to her own capital of $20 and simply lent at
4.25%).224
Crucially, in our example, this excess return of 5%
(9.25% less 4.25%) is entirely attributable to the liquidity pre-
mium that makes borrowing on call loans cheap. An investor
facing a “normal” commercial borrowing rate of 4.25% has no
incentive of borrowing to increase her securities purchases be-
yond her capital (there is no point to borrowing at 4.25% to
generate an expected return of 4.25%). Such an investor
would purchase $20 of securities rather than $100. All things
221. Today, similar strategies are taken by high leverage credit hedge
funds. See Ricks, supra note 13, at 85–87. In distinction from commercial
banks, call loans (or modern repo) represent borrowing on a secured basis,
and the value of collateral is marked-to-market on a frequent basis. See Orian
Peer, supra note 129.
222. This reflects a 20% required “margin” on the loan. For a discussion
of margin requirements in the call loan market, see Orian Peer, supra note
7.
223. The computation is as follows: At the end of the year, the security
generates a gross expected return of $4.25 (= 4.25% x $100). Against this,
the speculator pays interest of $2.4 on the call loan (= 3% x $80). The net
expected return is thus $1.85 (= $4.25 – $2.4). On a capital base of $20, this
is a 9.25% expected annual return (=$1.85/$20).
224. For expositional simplicity, this example abstracts from the liquidity
risks the speculator faces due mark-to-market constraint. For a discussion of
these risks, see Orian Peer, supra note 129.
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equal, the low demand would make corporate securities more
difficult to sell. The likely result would be a considerably
higher cost of capital for corporations.
FIGURE 12: NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FAÇADE CIRCA 1904
Picture taken from SHORPY, http://www.shorpy.com/node/10999 (last visited Feb. 19,
2018).
Having seen how call loans incentivized speculators to in-
crease their purchases, we now explore the role of those specu-
lative purchases in the floatation of new corporate securities.
The act of purchasing new securities from corporations and
distributing them to investors is called “underwriting.” Specu-
lators’ increased purchases facilitated the underwriting pro-
cess by helping corporate underwriters meet their own press-
ing liquidity constraints.
The reason underwriters’ liquidity was constrained was
the traditional separation between commercial and investment
banking.225 At the turn of the twentieth century, the leading
corporate underwriters were private investment banks like J.P.
Morgan & Co. and Khan Loeb & Co. These investment banks
225. The lines of division, however, were moving rapidly, which will be
expounded on below. See infra Section IV.C.
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did not hold a banking charter and were therefore restricted
under New York state law in their ability to maintain deposit
accounts for the general public.226 National banks, on the
other hand, were allowed to issue deposits, but the National
Bank Act did not allow them to engage in corporate under-
writing.227 “The gods,” goes the proverb, “send nuts to those
who have no teeth.”
This mismatch between nuts and teeth helps explain the
significance of the $766 million call loan market to the $26
billion securities market.228 While the call loan market was
small in comparison to the total stock of securities, it was actu-
ally quite large when scaled relative to resources of those un-
derwriters.
The relatively small size of underwriters meant these un-
derwriters were subject to serious liquidity constraints. When
an underwriter purchases securities from a corporation, it typi-
cally takes time to find “real money investors” who are willing
to purchase them. Real money investors are actors, like pen-
sion funds, who can purchase securities out of accumulated
savings. In other words, real money investors are actors who do
not have to borrow in order to pay the purchase price to the
underwriter.229 Meanwhile, while waiting to sell its securities to
real money investors, the underwriter itself could come under
a serious cash squeeze. The reason is that one of the main
functions of an underwriter is to advance cash to corpora-
226. Private bankers could generally avoid regulation by the state of New
York as long as they complied with certain requirements that prevented
them from holding small deposit accounts. See U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING & CURRENCY, THE PECORA INVESTIGATION: STOCK EXCHANGE PRAC-
TICES AND THE CAUSES OF THE 1929 WALL STREET CRASH 224–25 (Cosimo
Reports 2010) (1934).
227. National banks are only allowed to engage in activities included or
incidental to the “business of banking” as defined in Section 8 of the Na-
tional Bank Act. See National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified
as amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C.). But see infra Section IV.C (dis-
cussing the use of affiliates by the largest New York banks to circumvent this
provision).
228. See MICHIE, supra note 219; see also ARSÈNE PAULIN PUJO, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PURSUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504
TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT,
H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 45 (1913).
229. At the turn of the century, when pension and mutual funds were still
in their infancy, life insurance companies and investment trusts were the
most important real money investors.
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tions.230 When an underwriter purchases securities from a cor-
poration, it pays that corporation immediately, which could be
months before real money investors purchase the securities
from the underwriter.231 The call loan market emerged as a
way for underwriters to meet that cash squeeze.
To meet the cash squeeze, underwriters could sell the new
securities to speculators.232 The speculators, of course, used
only a small portion of their own capital to finance those
purchases; the remainder they borrowed through the call loan
market. The speculators would hold the securities for a few
months, make a profit, and then sell them on to more conven-
tional “real money investors.”233 With the proceeds from real
money investors, the speculators could repay their call loans to
the banks. They would then borrow again when underwriters
floated a fresh issue of securities.
It follows that the call loan market was not a static quan-
tity, but a dynamic flow. Underwriters and speculators used
this market as a kind of conveyor belt to move securities from
their initial purchasers to their ultimate investors. It is likely
that most securities listed on the NYSE—the big $26 billion—
began their lives as collateral in the much smaller call loan
market.234
Contemporaries of the Act had a clear understanding of
this conveyor–belt nature of the call loan market. Take, for
example, a speech by Thomas Woodlock, former editor of the
Wall Street Journal, at the 1908 Columbia lecture series on mon-
etary reform. Woodlock explained to the audience that securi-
ties were very much like consumer goods in that securities are
230. See JAMES EDWARD MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE
439–41 (1922).
231. Id. See Woodlock, supra note 218, at 25–27. Woodlock and Meeker
explain real money investors’ reluctance to purchase unseasoned securities
by focusing on the lack of reliable information of unseasoned securities, and
the low risk tolerance of real money investors. For an alternative explanation
focusing on monetary theory, see Orian Peer, supra note 7, ch. 3.
232. 232. In jargon, underwriting is considered a “moving” rather than a
“storage” business. For a modern discussion, see Report of Anton R. Valukas,
Examiner, at 58–78, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555
(JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
233. Meeker, supra note 230, at 457–59.
234. See, e.g., WILLIAM CLARKSON VAN ANTWERP, THE STOCK EXCHANGE
FROM WITHIN 110–11 (1913).
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produced “in advance of the actual demand for them.”235 Un-
til that actual demand appears, securities must be financed
somehow, just like inventories of consumer goods at the store.
The call loan market is that system which allows for the carry-
ing of securities inventories:
We have seen whence comes the demand for loans
on securities [i.e., call loans]. It comes from the peo-
ple who, as promoters, syndicators, jobbers, brokers
or speculators are carrying that floating mass of se-
curities of all kind . . . which has not yet gone into the
hands of permanent investors.236
Of course, if speculators had to borrow on call to relieve
underwriters of their inventories, that borrowing had to be
profitable. As demonstrated above, the opportunities created
by the low call rate was an important factor in the profitability
of the strategy. To summarize, low call rates increased specula-
tive demand and this speculative demand facilitated the work
of liquidity–constrained underwriters. In this way, the call loan
market was the financial machinery that made the rise of cor-
porate society possible. Given the enormous significance of
the call loan market, it is therefore, more than a little strange
to find corporate financiers supporting mainstream Demo-
crats’ definition of commercial paper. In fact, corporate finan-
ciers supported the very same definition Democrats believed
would handle a severe blow to the call loan market. In the next
section, we move to explore this peculiar coalition.
C. The Puzzling Coalition: Corporate Financiers and
Mainstream Democrats
One of the most surprising aspects of the politics of the
Act is the coalition between mainstream Democrats and corpo-
rate financiers on the exclusion of call loans from lender-of-
last-resort support. Given the central importance of call loans
to corporate finance, one would expect corporate financiers
had bitterly resisted this exclusion. Indeed, as discussed in Sec-
tion II, mainstream Democrats like Glass and Untermeyer be-
lieved Wall Street opposed the Act precisely on these
235. Woodlock, supra note 218, at 25.
236. Id. at 33. See also Warburg, supra note 150, at 29 (“[T]he amount in-
vested in stock exchange loans . . . represent[s] undigested securities and
securities carried for speculative investors.”).
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grounds.237 Against this intuition, one discovers that the cor-
porate financiers who took the most active role in monetary
reform—men like Frank Vanderlip and Paul Warburg—were
very much in line with mainstream Democrats’ vision.238
FIGURE 13: FRANK VANDERLIP OF NATIONAL CITY BANK
(RIGHT) AND PAUL WARBURG OF KUHN LOEB & CO (LEFT).
Paul Warburg (left), picture taken from WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Paul_Warburg (last visited Mar. 18, 2019); Frank Vanderlip (right), picture taken
from PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS ONLINE CATALOG, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://
www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/ggboun.25357/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
Take for example, Paul Warburg, a partner at the invest-
ment bank Kuhn Loeb & Co. that the Pujo Committee Report
described as belonging to the “inner circle” of the money
trust. Having recently migrated to the United States from Ger-
many, Warburg had been actively campaigning to create a Eu-
237. See Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 18.
238. It is important to note that my focus in this part is with corporate
financiers’ position on the Act’s lender-of-last-resort provision rather than
the Act as a whole. As hinted at in footnote 201 above, Vanderlip and
Warburg disagreed with Democrats on many details of the Act. Vanderlip
even cooperated with the group of senators on the Senate committee that
ultimately added the Hitchcock amendment against the position of the ad-
ministration. See supra Section III.C. President Wilson and Carter Glass be-
lieved Vanderlip was trying to sabotage the reform. Dunne, supra note 34, at
23–24. As the discussion below demonstrates, that seems unlikely.
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ropean style central bank in the United States since the Panic
of 1907. Throughout his advocacy work, Warburg bitterly com-
plained about bank investment in call loans as their liquid as-
sets and sought to replace call loans with commercial paper.
Very much in line with mainstream Democrats’ later design,
Warburg argued a commercial paper market could only be es-
tablished with a lender of last resort against that paper.239
Frank Vanderlip, president of National City Bank (another in-
ner circle member of the money trust) shared similar views in
his Senate committee testimony. When asked whether call
loans presented an element of danger or safety, he responded
“an element of danger and unsound banking.”240 Call loans
had to be stopped, “and no one is more anxious than the great
banks of New York to aid in this situation.”241
Corporate financiers’ agreement with mainstream Demo-
crats, as was noted above, is deeply puzzling. This puzzle is not
sufficiently appreciated, let alone resolved, in the historical
literature. Livingston, to take a prominent example, is un-
doubtedly correct in highlighting corporate financiers’ dissat-
isfaction with the growing instability of the call loan market.242
The Fed’s role as a lender of last resort was desirable to corpo-
rate financier’s to the extent it would help stabilize the call
loan market. Surely, however, corporate financiers did not in-
tend to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” and to have
the Act destroy the call market, instead of stabilizing it.
239. See, e.g., Warburg, supra note 150, at 20, 28 (referring to call loans as
“one of the gravest dangers of our time”); Reform Hearings, supra note 155, at
63 (statement of Paul Warburg).
240. Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 1926 (statement of
Frank A. Vanderlip).
241. Id. at 1946.
242. See supra Section I.B.
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FIGURE 14: SENATOR JOSEPH BRISTOW (R, KANSAS) OF THE
SENATE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE
Picture taken from SHORPY, http://www.shorpy.com/node/10999 (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2018).
Corporate financiers’ coalition with mainstream Demo-
crats is all the more puzzling considering that there were
lesser-known voices on Wall Street who believed call loans cer-
tainly ought to be entitled to lender-of-last-resort support. This
was especially the case with commentators affiliated with the
NYSE.243 Van Antwerp, a broker himself and author of a popu-
lar work on the stock exchange, analogized the broker’s role
to that of a “dealer in merchandise.”244 Desperately trying to
fit the broker within the mold of the real bills doctrine, he
explained the broker “seeks advances of credit upon his wares
just as the merchant does.”245 To exclude call loans from Fed
243. On the eve of the Federal Reserve Act, securities brokerage and in-
vestment banking were largely distinct lines of business. The New York Stock
Exchange was an association of 1100 brokers, governed by an elaborate con-
stitution. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EX-
CHANGE, WITH SOME RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNING COMMITTEE
(1902).
244. VAN ANTWERP, supra note 234, at 104.
245. Id.
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discounting, argued van Antwerp, would be not only unfair
but highly disruptive to corporate investment. He stated:
Prevent the banks from lending money to facilitate
stock-market operations [i.e., call loans] and business
ceases; interfere with it or hamper it and confidence
is impaired, and when these things happen the indus-
trial system collapses in terror. Until a system is de-
vised whereby large undertakings may enlist public
support in other ways than by offering securities in
our great Exchanges and by maintaining a market for
them there, it is useless to talk of interfering with that
necessary relationship which exists between the
banks and the stock market.246
In imagining a system of Fed support for call loans, van
Antwerp was certainly not alone.247 Indeed, when Thomas
Woodlock addressed the audience at Columbia in 1908, his
proposed solution was to stabilize the call loan market through
cooperation between the large New York banks, not through a
massive exodus of funds away from the call market into com-
mercial paper:
The main thing that seems to be needed is some sta-
bilizing force in the call-money market, and, if I may
be permitted the suggestion, it might be possible to
find this force in some method of concerted action
by lenders of money in which the bankers’ clearing-
house might play a part.248
Why then, one is pressed to ask, did men like Vanderlip
and Warburg so readily ignore the possibility of including call
loans in section 13, an omission that seems to be in such sharp
contrast to their agenda on credit distribution?249 While a
fuller examination of this apparent paradox awaits further
work, the remainder of this section offers several observations
that shed light on the paradox. These observations all point to
246. Id. at 107–08.
247. For a similar complaint on the exclusion of call loans from a NYSE
economist, see MEEKER, supra note 230, at 196 (1922).
248. Woodlock, supra note 218, at 39–40. See also LIVINGSTON, supra note
27, at 178.
249. This is especially puzzling given historical work that distances corpo-
rate financiers from real bills doctrine. See, e.g., Mehrling, supra note 34, at
212; LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at 24–25. See also supra note 141.
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the possibility that corporate financiers may have reasonably
believed the mainstream Democrats’ design could still further
the corporate distributive agenda despite its avowed purpose.
The first direction concerns corporate financiers’ expec-
tation that the Act would improve their ability to compete for
deposits on a national scale. Recall that under the Democrats’
design for the Act, the dismantling of the “pyramiding of
reserves” meant New York clearinghouse banks would lose
hundreds of millions in bankers’ balances, the same bankers’
balances these banks channeled to the call loan market. As
Frank Vanderlip explained in his testimony at the Senate Com-
mittee, while the loss of bankers’ balances was painful, the
New York banks believed they could offset it by new opportuni-
ties opened by the Act:
Mr. Vanderlip: I believe we [National City Bank] will
make up for those [country bank balances] in various
ways, some ways, perhaps, that will not be altogether
to the satisfaction of those who want to see the impor-
tance of New York reduced as a financial center. I do
not believe this measure will so reduce New York.250
These new opportunities came from New York banks’ in-
creased ability to compete with banks outside New York that
issued the vast majority of deposits in the country.251 With over
$200 million in deposits, National City was the largest bank in
the country.252 Nevertheless, as Vanderlip explained to the
senators, his bank faced serious obstacles in competing for de-
positors outside New York. The first obstacle was that under
the system of pyramided reserves, country banks were highly
valued customers for the NYCHA banks, because of the large
bankers’ balances they kept with them. National City itself
held $102 million of such balances. National City feared that
250. Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 1959 (statement of
Frank A. Vanderlip).
251. New York national banks had deposits of about $767 million, only
16% of total national bank deposits of $4808 million. See COMPTROLLER,
supra note 101, at 2. The proportions change somewhat when taking into
account non-national banks, but the point is clear.
252. See ARSÈNE PAULIN PUJO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PUR-
SUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRA-
TION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 72
(1913); see also Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 1959 (state-
ment of Frank A. Vanderlip).
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trying to develop direct relations with depositors outside New
York would “invade the field” of country bankers and result in
retaliation and loss of bankers’ balances.253
An even more important obstacle was the byzantine sys-
tem of inter-regional check collections that existed on the eve
of the Act. As James Cannon documented in his classic work,
the collection of checks between the country and New York
was a frustratingly long, circuitous, and expensive endeavor.254
The typical journey of a country check involved multiple corre-
spondent banks and local clearing houses with fees charged at
every step of the way.
The system’s inefficiency was notorious but it had an im-
portant side effect. The long and expensive process of check
collection rendered it impractical for many businesses to keep
deposits in New York for payments they intended to settle in
the country. Depositors were thus encouraged to maintain
their deposit accounts with country banks instead of moving
them to New York. In this way, the “inefficient” system of inter-
regional check collection was actually an essential component
of the National Bank Act’s restriction on branch banking. Af-
ter all, to the extent banks acquire means of serving customers
without physical branch presence, branching restrictions be-
came far less effective.255
Ironically, mainstream Democrats’ design for the Act was
going to modernize that “inefficient” system that supported
country banks. Democrats’ plan to establish the Fed as the new
national clearinghouse would have considerably reduced the
costs of inter-regional check collection.256 Country bankers bit-
terly resisted these provisions of the Act while corporate finan-
253. For size of balances see MYERS, supra note 44, at 246, 248 (1910 fig-
ure). It is important to mention in this respect that some country banks held
their bankers’ balances directly in New York (though they were allowed to
also hold them with dozens of Reserve City banks in various regional cen-
ters). For the “pyramiding of reserves,” see supra Section II.B.
254. CANNON, supra note 44, at 64–74 (especially the itinerary on p. 71).
255. Vanderlip, it is worth noting, considered the restrictions on branch
banking to be prejudiced and unnecessary. See Vanderlip, supra note 201, at
1, 14–15, 17.
256. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 16, ¶ 14, 38 Stat.
251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522 (2006)); Willis,
supra note 108, at 20; Edward J. Stevens, The Founders’ Intentions: Sources of the
Payment Services Franchise of the Federal Reserve Banks, (Fed. Reserve Fin. Servs.,
Working Paper No. 0396, 1996).
2019] NEGOTIATING THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 443
ciers strongly supported them.257 Vanderlip believed that this
new system of collection would allow New York to draw depos-
its from afar, essentially overcoming the restrictions on branch
banking. New York banks would be able to “offer to the coun-
try commercial borrower the same terms for collecting his
checks as his local bank could offer. So I think we will become
competitors for business in a much wider circle.”258
Vanderlip, of course, tried to win the Senators’ support by
promising this transformation would serve the interest of Main
Street commercial borrowers. The New York banks will use a
portion of the new deposits to increase their holding of com-
mercial paper, thus driving down rates for commercial borrow-
ers. In reality, of course, nothing prevented Vanderlip from
channeling a substantial portion of these funds to the stock
exchange.259
This brings us to a second trend that sheds light on corpo-
rate financiers’ support of the mainstream Democrat design. It
concerns the erosion of the dividing line between commercial
and investment banking. As discussed above, that dividing line
was important for understanding the significance of the call
loan market in late nineteenth century.260 In the years preced-
ing the Federal Reserve Act, those lines were being rapidly
redrawn. Vanderlip’s National City was itself a case in point.
Despite holding a national banking charter, the bank was in-
creasingly venturing into the securities underwriting business
through newly formed affiliates.261
On the other side of the divide, investment banks were
venturing into the core function of commercial banking busi-
257. Country banks derived a large portion of their earnings from the
charging of fees on exchange. For country bank resistance, see, e.g., Banking
and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 1566–67 (statement of George W.
Rogers); id. at 1526 (statement of Francis W. Foot).
258. Id. at 1959 (statement of Frank A. Vanderlip).
259. As Vanderlip argued, the relatively higher interest rates on commer-
cial paper would have made it profitable for his bank to shift out of call loans
into commercial paper. However, this narrow calculus completely ignores
the side benefits that investment in call loans had in supporting the banks’
underwriting business. See supra Sections II.B, IV.B.
260. See supra Section IV.B.
261. See ARSÈNE PAULIN PUJO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PUR-
SUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRA-
TION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 72
(1913); Brandeis, supra note 106.
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ness. Though prohibited from maintaining deposit accounts
for the general public, investment banks were becoming de-
positories to the large corporations they served.262 In fact, as
the Pujo Committee Report documented, J.P. Morgan & Co.
and Kuhn Loeb & Co. were among the largest lenders in the
call loan market.263 What is more, investment and commercial
banks were increasingly cooperating with each other, thereby
further blurring the dividing lines between their activities.
That, at the very least, was the central thesis of the Pujo Com-
mittee Report. The Report’s list of the “most active agents” of
“concentration in money and credit” included J.P. Morgan
and Kuhn Loeb side by side with Vanderlip’s National City and
the First National Bank of New York.264 As the Pujo Commit-
tee Report meticulously documents, these institutions fre-
quently cooperated in underwriting syndicates.265 Finally, a
third development that was changing the relationship between
commercial banking and securities markets was the rise of
what contemporaries called “financial banking.”266 Financial
banking referred to banks increasing the share of their assets
held as corporate securities in distinction from traditional
loans to non-corporate borrowers. According to Anna
Youngman, an early observer of financial banking, the share of
banks’ corporate securities to their individual deposits nearly
tripled between 1889 and 1905, from 8% to 22%.267
It is strikingly ironic, then, that while men like Vanderlip
and Warburg were joining mainstream Democrats in exalting
the virtues of commercial paper, the U.S. banking system was
rapidly moving in the opposite direction.268 These various
trends all had a similar effect. They were structurally opening
up possibilities for corporate financiers to harness the money
supply to channel credit into corporate activity.
262. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 57.
263. Id. at 34.
264. Id. at 56.
265. Id. at 92–100.
266. Anna Youngman, The Growth of Financial Banking, 14 J. POL. ECON.
435, 435–43 (1906). See also LIVINGSTON, supra note 27, at 138–39.
267. Youngman, supra note 266, at 436. This statistic includes national,
state and private banks, and loan and trust companies. The increase for na-
tional banks alone was from 7% to 17%.
268. Indeed, Vanderlip himself alluded to this theme in his address at the
1908 Columbia lecture series. See Vanderlip, supra note 201, at 12.
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The pyramiding of reserves was once necessary to channel
deposits from the country into New York due to the frag-
mented conditions of the check collection system. With a
more “efficient” system, the large New York banks could com-
pete for those deposits directly, thus becoming immune to the
loss of bankers’ balances. Sales of securities to speculators were
once necessary to ease the cash squeeze experienced by under-
writers that lacked a deep depository base. With the blending
of commercial and investment banking, underwriters could
now fund their securities inventories with deposits, thereby re-
ducing the need for speculators to borrow on call. Finally,
sales of securities to speculators were also necessary because
banks themselves were rather timid in their purchases of cor-
porate securities. With greater and greater willingness to
purchase these securities outright (and fund them through de-
posits), speculators’ demand could again be expected to de-
cline. The banks and the underwriters were essentially inter-
nalizing the function formerly played by speculators.
From the point of view of corporate financiers, the Fed-
eral Reserve’s powers as a lender of last resort could support
this development. As a lender of last resort, the Fed could per-
haps play a supportive role for New York banks’ expanded role
in securities markets, even if call loans themselves were ex-
cluded from lender-of-last-resort support. These banks could
hold a relatively small portion of their assets in the form of
commercial paper, while continuing to hold a larger share in
the form of securities and call loans. Whenever they came
under stress, the banks could then discount the commercial
paper with the Fed, thus obviating the need to liquidate securi-
ties and transmit stress to the securities market.
While further work is required on corporate financiers’
motivations in supporting the mainstream Democrat design
for the Act, one thing seems clear. This strange coalition was
not merely the result of shared vision on the financial stability
benefits of a lender of last resort. Nor did it necessarily reflect
the political—or even the intellectual—capture of mainstream
Democrats by corporate financiers. Instead, it appears more
reasonable that both positions were shaped to some important
degree by their respective distributive agendas. Each camp
simply had a different set of predictions as to the implications
of lender of last resort on the distribution of credit.
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The rhetoric of the real bills doctrine provided a shared
language for the strange coalition between corporate finan-
ciers and mainstream Democrats. Both camps used the doc-
trine to justify limiting lender-of-last-resort powers to support-
ing short-term “self-liquidating” commercial paper. Despite
this shared language, corporate financiers never subscribed to
mainstream Democrats’ view of disconnecting the securities
markets from the banking system.269 Vanderlip, to take a nota-
ble example, felt quite comfortable with commercial banks
continuing to make call loans and even holding corporate se-
curities outright.270
Thus, corporate financiers were able to brew a seemingly
impossible concoction where the orthodox banking idea of
“self-liquidating” paper could co-exist with a money supply in-
creasingly funding long-term corporate securities. Agrarian ad-
vocates took the exact opposite side of this debate. They
wanted the banking system to fund long-term investment in
the agricultural periphery, while using real-bills rhetoric to de-
nounce the abnormality of bank funding of call loans. Ironi-
cally, despite their differences, what both these camps ulti-
mately desired was the same: harnessing the banking system to
facilitate the formation of fixed capital. In the Epilogue below
we now move to explore the failure of a corporate-agrarian
coalition.
Epilogue: The Unrealized Coalition
A central theme of the history just told is the role of coali-
tion building and compromise in the shaping up of the Act’s
lender-of-last-resort authority. Each of the three groups viewed
the new lender-of-last-resort power as a chance to improve
their distinct agenda on credit distribution. The central node
in the complex process of coalition building between the dif-
ferent agendas was doubtlessly the mainstream Democratic po-
269. For mainstream Democrats’ assault on the call market, see supra Sec-
tion II.B of this article. One important way in which the difference between
mainstream Democrats’ and corporate financiers’ positions manifested was
the status of balances kept with correspondents. The Federal Reserve Act
revoked the reserve status of bankers’ balances whereas the more corporate
friendly Aldrich Plan did not. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
270. For his views on outright holding of securities, see Vanderlip, supra
note 201, at 4–12. For his views on call loans, see Banking and Currency Hear-
ings, supra note 102, at 1972–73.
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sition. On the one hand, mainstream Democrats forged a coa-
lition with agrarians. This coalition was rooted in a shared anti-
corporate sentiment, and made small—through non-trivial—
concessions for agrarian accommodation paper. On the other
hand, mainstream Democrats entered a second coalition with
corporate financiers. This time, the coalition was built on
shared commitments to orthodox real bills ideas, though cor-
porate financiers had reasonable grounds to believe these
ideas would be far less devastating to corporate finance than
Democrats did.
This Democrat-centered coalition structure meant that a
third coalition remained largely unrealized: the coalition be-
tween the corporate and regional development agendas. At
first glance, the potential for such corporate-agrarian coopera-
tion seems unlikely given the enormous divides between these
constituencies, differences that are both material and ideologi-
cal. Then again, the two coalitions formed by mainstream
Democrats were themselves rife with tension. What is more, as
previously suggested, agrarians and corporate financiers did
share an important feature in common: both these groups
wished to harness the banking system to provide long-term
credit, which is, after all, precisely what mainstream Democrats
were trying to prevent. The remaining paragraphs speculate
on this potential common ground for a corporate-agrarian co-
alition, the quintessential “road not taken” for the Act.
One potential ground for corporate–agrarian coopera-
tion was the network of correspondent relations that tied
country banks in the periphery to the large banks of the me-
tropolis.271 This network provided country banks with some-
thing Democrats tried to deny them: liquidity support for their
accommodation paper.
On the eve of the Act, it was common practice for the
large correspondent banks to act as a private lender of last re-
sort to the country banks that kept bankers’ balances with
them. As Oliver Lockhart documented, correspondents of-
271. Indeed, Democrats like Untermyer repeatedly complained that large
correspondent banks were inducing country banks to oppose the bill. See,
e.g., Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 1288–1369 (statement
of Samuel Untermeyer). These complaints were not without foundation. See,
e.g., id. at 1542–45 (statement of H.A. Moelenpah). At the same time, these
efforts seem to have left country bankers frustrated and did not manage to
create a robust coalition.
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fered their country bank customers “credit lines” secured by
accommodation paper. According to these credit line arrange-
ments, a country bank that kept an average balance in New
York throughout the year was entitled to draw up to five times
the amount of that average in time of need.272 The city corre-
spondents, in other words, were accepting precisely the type of
collateral that men like Glass and Parker Willis were struggling
to keep out of section 13.
Viewed from this point of view, mainstream Democrats’
assault on the “pyramiding of reserves” was actually a source of
concern for many country bankers. As we have seen, section 19
of the Act cancelled the reserve status of balances kept with
correspondents and required those balances to be transferred
to the Fed.273 This meant a reduction in the average size of
balances kept with correspondents and, consequently, a
shrinking of credit lines for country banks. With section 13 in
place, the Federal Reserve banks, of course, were much more
restrictive in the collateral they accepted than the correspon-
dent banks.274 Many country bankers dreaded the tightening
of credit that might result from the transfer. As one country
banker from Lawrence, Massachusetts, complained before the
Senate Committee:
This bill disturbs, if it does not disrupt the relations—
I will not call them pleasant relations, although they
are—present relations of collection and accommoda-
tion [i.e., lending] between a country bank and its
city banker. The city banker, the reserve agent, and
the country banker are very closely connected and
272. See Oliver C. Lockhart, Interbank Borrowing in the National System, 29 J.
POL. ECON. 138, 156 (1921). Lockhart also mentioned that the paper secur-
ing the loan are typically shorter than six months though the loans them-
selves can be extended. Id. at 157.
273. See supra Section II.C.
274. Large correspondent banks were under considerable pressure to of-
fer credit lines to their country bank customers. The large clearing banks of
New York and other financial centers were loath to compete with each other
in price terms, that is, by offering higher interest rates on the bankers’ bal-
ances kept with the bank. See Brian C. Gendreau, The Implicit Return on Bank-
ers’ Balances, 15 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 411, 413 (1983). In fact, since
the mid-1890s, the NYCHA prohibited banks from paying in excess of 2% on
bankers’ balances. Clearing banks competed instead through the services
they offered their country bank customers, including the credit lines they
extended.
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must be. There is no way of divorcing them if we are
to carry on a successful system of banking.275
A second potential site for corporate–agrarian coopera-
tion was the agrarian plea to broaden access to farm mortgage
credit by engineering new monetary solutions.276 To be sure,
corporate financiers opposed these agrarian demands as much
as mainstream Democrats, but their position was, in a sense,
puzzling. After all, the crowning achievement of corporate fin-
anciers was precisely in mobilizing call loan credit for long-
term capital formation. The agrarian “heretics” were asking
for no more than to adapt for their own ends the same appara-
tus corporate financiers have been using for decades.
A most striking moment in this respect occurred in the
Senate Committee in an exchange between Frank Vanderlip
and the agrarian Senator Joseph Bristow (R, Kansas). The
backdrop to this exchange was Vanderlip’s attempt to con-
vince the senators that making commercial paper eligible for
Fed discounting would favor Main Street commercial borrow-
ers. In line with the mainstream Democrat’s theory, Vanderlip
promised that once the Fed supported commercial paper as a
lender of last resort, his bank would shift a portion of its call
loans into commercial paper.277 Having grasped the principle,
Bristow seized the moment and tried to apply it to favor pe-
ripheral credit need instead of urban ones278asking,
“[s]uppose the farm mortgage could be cashed [i.e., used as
collateral for a loan] in those Federal reserve banks just the
same at any time you wanted to. Would that be desirable?”279
Vanderlip’s attitude was dismissive, channeling the ortho-
dox emphasis on short-term paper he shared with mainstream
Democrats: “It would be most undesirable, just as it is most
undesirable to permit those banks to rediscount loans made
on stock exchange collateral . . . . There is nothing liquidating
about a farm loan.”280 Dismissive as his response was, Vander-
275. Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 1249 (statement of
Justin Varney).
276. The 1916 Federal Farm Loan Act was a significant—though limited—
step for this agrarian agenda. See supra note 187.
277. Banking and Currency, supra note 102, at 1941 (statement of Frank
Vanderlip).
278. Id. at 1961 (statement of Joseph Bristow).
279. Id.
280. Id. (statement of Frank Vanderlip)
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lip’s analogy between farm mortgages and call loans demon-
strated their implicit affinity. The ensuing discussion, while
brief, showed the kind of conceptual puzzles contemporaries
faced in trying to draw the lines between “legitimate” and “ille-
gitimate” loans: those that were self-liquidating—and hence,
eligible for Fed discounting—and those that were not.
Was commercial paper self-liquidating thanks to its intrin-
sic qualities or owing to its eligibility for Fed discount? Bristow
wondered that much aloud. If the liquidity of commercial pa-
per was intrinsic, why was Fed discounting required in the first
place?281 On the other hand, if call loans were not self-liqui-
dating in theory, how did they come to be so liquid in prac-
tice? Perhaps it was, because there was a ready market for
stocks and bonds, whereas no such market existed for farm
mortgages. As Senator Knute Nelson (R, Minnesota) noted,
“[i]f you had that same market for farm mortgages as you have
for stocks and bonds on the NYSE, then I should regard farm
mortgages as liquid as those others (i.e., call loans).”282
Perhaps, then, one should establish a liquid market for
farm mortgages? This promising exercise in institutional de-
sign was soon aborted with further resuscitation of the real
bills doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Exchanges like those between Bristow, Nelson, and Van-
derlip reveal some of the roads not taken for the Fed’s role as
a lender of last resort. As that interlude hints, all credit instru-
ments ultimately rely for their liquidity on institutional ar-
rangements in the markets where they trade. Revising those
institutional arrangements is precisely the task faced by re-
formers. What then, we might ask, determines the choice be-
tween one set of institutional arrangements and another?
Participants in the debate on lenders of last resort since
the Global Financial Crisis have implicitly responded to this
question by making their arguments in the language of finan-
281. Warburg himself, though a strong supporter of a liquid commercial
paper market, made a closely related point. See Reform Hearings, supra note
155, at 63 (statement of Paul Warburg); see also Moulton, supra note 143.
282. Banking and Currency Hearings, supra note 102, at 1962 (statement of
Frank Vanderlip). The views expressed by Senator Nelson later in the discus-
sion relapse into the real bills emphasis on “self-liquidating” paper.
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cial stability. My argument here has been that in the original
debate over lenders of last resort, the different groups’ agen-
das on credit distribution were as influential as their views on
financial stability.
Today, one of the most important contexts for making
these distributive stakes explicit is the debate over the “shadow
banking” system. Modern shadow banking is strikingly similar
to the call loans discussed in this article. Shadow banks are
institutions—like broker–dealers and hedge funds—that use
short-term borrowing to fund long-term securities. The
stresses experienced by this system during the crisis were the
backdrop for the unprecedented expansion of the Fed’s role
as a lender of last resort.283 The Fed’s policies have supported
not only new institutions—broker–dealers and money market
funds—but also entire markets, most importantly, the market
for asset backed securities.284
As hinted in the Introduction, the Fed has become the
subject of considerable controversy, and even has led to cer-
tain legislative reforms in the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act.285 While
a discussion of these reforms is beyond our current scope, my
central concern is with the way participants in the modern de-
bate neglected to consider the implications of their positions
for credit distribution. After all, in deciding whether the
shadow banking system—or parts of it—is deserving of lender-
of-last-resort support, it should matter a great deal what seg-
ments of the economy that system serves. That analysis has
never been made, with participants instead making their argu-
ments purely on grounds of financial stability.
It would be an exaggeration to say that theories of finan-
cial stability—be they modern theories or the now ancient real
bills doctrine—are merely an ideological gloss over partici-
pants’ underlying distributive preferences. Financial stability
considerations are obviously important, and lobbying efforts
aside, those who raise them often act out of a genuine sense of
urgency. At the same time, one does not need to argue that
financial stability considerations mask distributive agendas in
order to appreciate the importance of making the distributive
stakes explicit. As the history of the Act reveals, one’s views of
283. See Fleming, supra note 5.
284. Id.; see also Mehrling, supra note 34.
285. See supra note 13.
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financial stability are themselves inevitably embedded within a
broader vision of social stability. The type of credit promoting
one’s own agenda tends to feel wholesome and deserving of
institutional support while credit promoting another’s agenda
appears speculative and irresponsible. The result of such re-
form efforts is as much a political negotiation—at times with
very uneven results—as it is a careful elucidation of some doc-
trine on financial stability. For those interested in a fairer dis-
tribution of credit and opportunity, the lender of last resort
remains a ripe context for legal reform.
